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The Supreme Court of Canada,
Charter Dialogue, and Deference
ROSALIND DIXON *
For those concerned about the democratic legitimacy of Charterreview by Canadian courts,
the idea of dialogue offers a promising middle path between the extremes of judicial and
legislative supremacy. Current dialogue theory, however, largely fails to Live up to this
promise of compromise. Instead of distinguishing democratic worries associated with US
style, strong-form judicial review, it largely endorses the legitimacy of such review. For
dialogue to live up to its original promise, a new theory that more clearly distinguishes
Canada from the United States is required. This article offers a new theory of dialogue in
which the willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC to defer to reasonable legisla-
tive sequels will be the key to success. As a result, section 33 of the Charterwill play a
valuable, but largely background role in promoting dialogue. The advantage of this approach,
compared to rival approaches that would weaken judicial review, is that it is more realistic
and more in line with existing SCC practice. Moreover, this approach is normatively desir-
able when judged from the perspective of the courts' capacity to counter blockages in the
legislative process that might otherwise impair the enjoyment of Charterrights.
Pour ceux-qui voient d'un eit inquiet ta [6gitimit6 d6mocratique de ['examen de Ia Charte
laquelle proc&dent les tribunaux canadiens, l'id6e d'un dialogue offre un compromis
prometteur entre deux extremes - la supr~matie du pouvoirjudiciaire et [a supr6matie du
pouvoir l6gislatif. Toutefois, La th~orie actueLle du dialogue ne respecte aucunement cette
promesse d'un compromis. Au lieu de distinguer Les pr6occupations d6mocratiques asso-
ci6es au style am6ricain - une revue judiciaire pure et dure - elle cautionne targement (a
lgitimit6 d'un tel examen. Pour que le dialogue remplisse sa promesse de d6part, it faut
une nouvelle th6orie qui 6tablisse une distinction plus claire entre le Canada et les Etats-
Unis. Dans cet article qui propose une nouvelle th6orie du dialogue, [a votont6 de ta Cour
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supr@me du Canada 6 se d~f6rer A des s~quelles Lgislatives raisonnables repr6sentera La
c16 de Ia r6ussite. Par cons6quent, Le chapitre 33 de [a Charteremplira un r~le important,
mais surtout accessoire, sur Le plan de ['incitation au dialogue. Lavantage d'une teltle
d~marche par rapport aux d~marches rivales qui affaibliraient La revue judiciaire, cest
qu'ele est plus r~aliste, plus harmonis6e 6 [a pratique existante de [a Cour supr~me. En
outre, cette d~marche est souhaitable du point de vue normatif quand on La juge sous
tangle de [a capacit6 des tribunaux h surmonter Les blocages dans le processus l~gistatif,
blocages qui autrement entraveraient l'appr~ciation des droits que confure [a Charte.
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FOR SOME, MORE THAN ENOUGH HAS BEEN SAID about the idea of dialogue as a
metaphor for the relationship between courts and legislatures under the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.' There have been more than ten years
of debate about dialogue in Canada,2 but little progress in persuading skeptics
that the practice of judicial review by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
2. See e.g. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997)
35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Kent Roach, "Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues
Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481
[Roach, "Common Law"]; Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or
Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001); Kent Roach, "Dialogic Judicial Review
and its Critics" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 49 at 54 [Roach, "Dialogic Review"];
-Kent Roach, "Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues About Rights: The
Canadian Experience" (2005) 40 Tex. Int'l L.J. 537 [Roach, "Canadian Experience"];
Kent Roach, "A Dialogue About Principle and a Principled Dialogue: Justice lacobucci's
Substantive Approach to Dialogue" (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 449; and Peter W. Hogg, Allison
A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or 'Much Ado
About Metaphors"' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 2.
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can be reconciled with a commitment to self-government in a democracy, as
the original literature on dialogue promised.
For skeptics, the primary democratic worry about judicial review under the
Charter is that, when it comes to open-ended Charter guarantees, Canadian courts
may adopt an interpretation that is directly counter-majoritarian in nature.
While the Charter is not intended to be a purely majoritarian instrument, from
a democratic point of view, the constitutional understandings of a majority of
Canadians still have an important role to play in the interpretation of the Charter.
Rights guarantees are open-ended and permit multiple reasonable interpreta-
tions-there is no objectively ascertainable, "correct" interpretation.' This
applies to the text and history of the Charter, to Supreme Court precedent, and
to the matter of Charter values-because, at an abstract philosophical level,
there will be just as much (if not more) room for reasonable disagreement about
the scope and priority to be given to particular, individual rights.6
If Canada is committed to principles of democracy, as section 1 of the
Charter suggests, the only principled way of interpreting such guarantees is by
reference to the actual understandings of Canadians about specific Charter
guarantees, or to the more general requirements of section 1 itself. If equality
matters in the process of self-government, the understandings of every Canadian
3. For the promise of reconciliation in dialogue theory, see the special issue, "Charter Dialogue:
Ten Years Later" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. See also Hogg & Bushell, ibid. at 105. For
the failure of dialogic arguments to persuade skeptics, see e.g. Grant Huscroft, "Rationalizing
Judicial Power: The Mischief of Dialogue Theory" in James B. Kelly & Christopher P.
Manfredi, eds., Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); Andrew Petter, "Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too
Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn't Such a Good Thing After All)" (2007) 45
Osgoode Hall L.J. 147.
4. See e.g. Petter, ibid. In the US context, compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986) at 16-23, 235. For other democratic objections to judicial review, such as those based
on its capacity to discourage or distort legislative constitutional deliberation, see James B.
Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law" (1893) 7
Harv. L. Rev. 129; Mark Tushnet, "Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation:
Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty" (1995) 94 Mich. L. Rev.
245 at 292, 299 [Tushnet, "Policy Distortion"].
5. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at
112-13, 149-63 [Waldron, Disagreement].
6. Ibid.
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should also count in a roughly equal way in this context. A problem arises when
the SCC prefers its own understanding of the Charter to that of a clear majority
of Canadians.
In the United States, this problem has spawned a large literature on the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" associated with judicial review by the United
States Supreme Court (USSC).' The sense of difficulty is particularly acute,
most American scholars agree, because it is almost impossible to modify the ef-
fect of Supreme Court decisions by amending the Constitution under the terms
of Article V.8 It is also compounded by the insistence of the USSC, in recent
years, upon its broad and exclusive authority to determine the meaning of con-
stitutional rights-even in the face of legislative "dialogue" by Congress under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-and by its rigid, categorical approach
to assessing the constitutionality of particular legislative provisions.9
In Canada, dialogue scholars, such as Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, have
argued that certain structural features of the Charter, together with the actual
record of legislative responses to SCC decisions, mean that these same concerns
about democratic legitimacy "cannot be sustained" or, at the very least, are
"greatly diminished."" They argue that because Parliament or the legislature, in
reliance on these structural features, have almost always been able to reverse,
modify, or avoid the effect of SCC Charter decisions with which they disagree,
"it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the Court and the compe-
tent legislative body as a dialogue."" Together with Wade Wright, Hogg and
Bushell further suggest that this dialogue indicates that, under the Charter, a
balance is achieved between the extremes of judicial supremacy and legislative
supremacy, known as "strong-form" and "weak-form" judicial review, respec-
7. See Barry Friedman, "The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five" (2002) 112 Yale L.J. 153.
8. See e.g. Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of
ConstitutionalAmendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
9. For a critique of the Supreme Court's approach in this context from a perspective
sympathetic to, though not synonymous with, new dialogue theory, see e.g. Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, "Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on
Section Five Power" (2003) 78 Ind. L.J. 1 at 25, 28.
10. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 2 at 80, 105.
11. Ibid. at 79.
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tively.' 2 More specifically, they suggest that, since the Charter, Canada has
adopted something of "a halfway house between the strong form of judicial
review typified by the United States and the statutory bill of rights typified by
the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960."'"
The idea of dialogue also clearly supports this understanding." By describ-
ing the possibility of an ongoing exchange between courts and legislatures in
their interpretations of the Charter, dialogue as a metaphor clearly points to a
potential midway path between the extremes of both legislative and judicial fi-
nality. It suggests that, rather than courts or legislatures being wholly final in
their interpretation of the Charter, both court decisions and legislative responses
to those decisions-"legislative sequels"-could be understood to have a much
more provisional, penultimate legal force. 5
On closer inspection, however, current dialogue theory's interpretation of
provisions such as'sections 1 and 33 of the Charter provides little basis for dis-
tinguishing Canada's version of review from US style, strong-form (i.e.,
strongly final) judicial review. 6 By interpreting section 33 as a more or less ex-
haustive vehicle for interpretive dialogue under the Charter-when section 33
12. Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2 at 4. On the idea of strong- versus weak-
form judicial review, see Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and
Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008) [Tushnet, Weak Courts].
13. Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, ibid. at 29.
14. Cf The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. "dialogue."
Dialogue, n.: 1. a. A conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk
together; b. Verbal interchange of thought between two or more persons, conversation; c. In
Politics ... valuable or constructive discussion or communication.
15. Cf Dan T. Coenen, "A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue" (2001) 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1575 at
1582-83 (arguing that dialogue involves court decisions being provisional or revisable in
character); Michael J. Perry, "Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the
Courts?" (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635. Perry advances a theory of judicial
"penultimacy" in which "electorally accountable legislators have the last word" (at 674) and
links the theory of penultimate review to the concept of dialogue (at 676).
16. Section 1 provides that Parliament or the legislature may impose limits on rights (judicially
understood), though subject to certain conditions. Section 33, or the so-called
"notwithstanding clause," provides that Parliament or the legislature may, for a certain
period, override particular Charter rights, provided it does so expressly. For further discussion
of these provisions, see infra notes 86-96.
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has almost never been used for that purpose-dialogue scholars effectively
validate, rather than challenge, the obstacles to Congress or state legislatures in
the United States overriding USSC decisions via Article V. Similarly, by arguing
that the SCC is not required to show any deference (under section 1 or internal
limitation clauses) to legislative attempts to engage in dialogue, these scholars
also affirm, rather than criticize, the approach of the USSC towards provisions
such as section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For dialogue theory to live up to its original promise of persuading skeptics
about the democratic legitimacy of rights-based review in Canada, a new theory
of Charter dialogue is therefore required."i The purpose of this article is to de-
velop such a theory. In the new theory of dialogue, the key to "weakening"
judicial review in Canada, relative to that in the United States, will be to insist
that the SCC defer to Parliament or the legislature's interpretation of the
Charter in "second look cases," provided that such a deference is reasonable
when judged by reference to certain minimal criteria." As a complement to
this, dialogue will also require that the SCC stand ready, in second look cases
where it has previously reasoned broadly under the Charter, to narrow the force
of that reasoning ex post, so as to reconcile ex post deference with its prior
precedents. There are several reasons, outlined below, for adopting such an ex
post deference-based approach.
First, it is unrealistic to regard section 33 as a routine vehicle for dia-
logue, given both its history and structure. Instead, section 33 shoihld be
understood as a valuable incentive for (and a textual confirmation of the de-
sirability of) the SCC's engagement in ex post deference or narrow statement
of this kind. It serves this function by providing Parliament and the legisla-
ture with a residual power to override the SCC, in the event that the SCC
fails to show such deference.
Second, an ex post deference-based approach gives the SCC maximum
flexibility to counter blockages in the legislative process that might otherwise
impair the enjoyment of Charter rights. By preserving scope for the SCC to rea-
17. Cf Jeremy Waldron, "Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators" in Grant
Huscroft & Ian Brodie, eds., Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham: LexisNexis
Canada, 2004) 7 at 39-46 [Waldron, "Models"].
18. Ibid. at 46 (suggesting that "if the Court is never willing to defer ... to anyone or anything
except past decisions by the Court, then there is little chance of genuine engagement and
dialogue").
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son "deeply" in first look cases, ex post-or "second look""---deference en-
hances the SCC's ability to persuade Parliament, the legislature, and even the
public, to give greater attention or accommodation to Charter rights.2" By
insisting that first look decisions are binding, this approach also gives the SCC
greater ability than pure weak-form theories of review to counter the most
persistent forms of legislative inattention to Charter rights claims. The pro-
posed theory also has the advantage of having a greater degree of fit with
existing Charter history and SCC practice than rival theories.
It may look as though the SCC is being asked to practice two different
forms of review, but, as the article explains, this approach to second look deci-
sion making should not be rejected out of a concern for judicial independence.
Provided that courts are mindful of certain preconditions, such an approach
will be fully compatible with the maintenance of judicial independence.21 Fur-
thermore, given the inevitability of some interpretive uncertainty under the
Charter, and the stability created by a presumption of constitutionality at the
second look stage, this theory of expost deference and judicial narrow statement
does not meaningfully threaten interpretive consistency or predictability under
the Charter.
This new understanding reveals that the history of dialogue under the
Charter to date has tended to be more real than skeptics fear and more contin-
gent than dialogue scholars assure. (That is to say, there has been a higher rate
19. The distinction between first and second look cases will, of course, be somewhat fluid, given
that first look cases may involve indirect consideration of prior precedents, and second look
cases may involve consideration of new circumstances in addition to prior precedents. See e.g.
Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 JTI-Macdonalal. The
distinction, however, is one that both the SCC and commentators have endorsed as helping to
distinguish between circumstances in which the SCC lacks reliable information about the
considered Charter views of Parliament or the legislature on a particular question on the one
hand, and from those in which such information is directly available from recent legislative
debate and action on the other. In a scholarly context, see Hogg & Bushell, supra note 2.
20. On the concept of deep reasoning, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial
Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
Sunstein defines "depth" in terms of the degree to which a judge's reasons are overtly
theoretical or normative (16-19).
21. At most, concerns about judicial independence may imply that some form of delay in the
consideration of second look cases is an additional requirement of successful dialogue, not
that the theory of new dialogue itself should be abandoned. See also infra notes 32-38,
145-49.
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of dialogue than skeptics admit, but fewer instances and less endorsement of
dialogue than advocates claim.)
The most important test of dialogue in new dialogue theory will be
whether the SCC or lower courts are willing, in second look cases, to actually
defer to legislative sequels that evidence interpretive disagreement with the
courts. On this measure, there has already been a high rate of dialogic success.
Another important test will be whether legislative sequels of this kind enjoy
meaningful defacto success. On this criterion, there have been an even greater
number of instances of dialogic success.
At the same time, there have been relatively few cases-no more than four
at the SCC level-in which dialogue has truly been tested. This means that it is
still premature to draw firm conclusions about the relative strength or weakness
of Charter review by Canadian courts. Even more important is that while gen-
erally acting consistently with the requirements of new dialogue theory, the
SCC has not endorsed its premises, and, as such, the future of dialogue still
hangs in the balance.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I outlines the broad contours of
current dialogue theory and explains how it tends largely to endorse, rather
than to distinguish, US style, strong-form judicial review. Part !! develops the
core elements of a new, alternative theory of dialogue, its prescriptions for sec-
tion 33 of the Charter as a vehicle for dialogue, its advantages over rival
theories, and its answers to potential criticisms. Part III reassesses the record of
dialogue under the Charter to date, in light of the understandings of what con-
stitutes new dialogue, as set out in the preceding parts. Part IV concludes by
considering the preconditions for, and therefore the contingency of, new dia-
logue under the Charter in the future.
I. DIALOGUE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE UNITED STATES AS
A COMPARATOR
In comparative constitutional scholarship on judicial review, the United States
is generally understood as the archetypical model of strong-form-or final-
judicial review.22 This is not because Congress or state legislatures consistently
22. See Stephen Gardbaum, "The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism" (2001) 49
Am. J. Comp. L. 707 at 709-10; Mark Tushnet, "New Forms of Judicial Review and the
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defer to the USSC's interpretations of the Constitution or decline to re-enact
legislation that has been struck down for inconsistency with the Constitution.23
Like their Canadian counterparts, it is common practice for Congress and the
state legislatures to respond to USSC decisions that invalidate their legislation
for inconsistency.2 ' For example, Justice Mitchell Pickerill has shown that,
between 1954 and 1997, Congress responded to USSC decisions at a rate of
sixty-two per cent.25 In only a small minority of those instances did Congress
repeal the prior legislation, with the result that in almost fifty per cent of cases,
it chose to re-enact its statutory policy. 26 Notwithstanding this practice on the
part of American legislatures, the reason the United States is considered to em-
body a system of strong-form judicial review is that Congress and state
legislatures in the United States face a number of obstacles to success when they
seek to engage in "dialogue" of this kind.27
Substantial formal legal barriers under Article V of the US Constitution
deter Congress or state legislatures from formally overriding a decision of the
Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments require the support of a two-thirds
majority of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and rati-
fication by three-fourths of the states. 28 As the size of the House, Senate, and
number of states in the United States have increased, this requirement has
become increasingly onerous.29 In recent decades, even proposed amendments
enjoying a high degree of popular support-such as the Equal Rights
Amendment (which would have inserted an express guarantee of equal protection
on the grounds of gender into the Fourteenth Amendment)-have failed. In
Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries" (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813 at
814 [Tushnet, "New Forms"].
23. See Barry Friedman, "Dialogue and Judicial Review" (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577
[Friedman, "Dialogue"]; Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
24. Ibid.
25. J. Mitchell Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact ofJudicial Review in
a Separated System (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004) at 42.
26. Ibid
27. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 23; Friedman, "Dialogue," supra note 23.
28. U.S. Const. art. V.
29. Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, "Amending the Constitution: Article V and The Effect
of Voting Rule Inflation" (National Bureau of Economic Researcl (NBER), Working Paper,
2009) [copy on file with author].
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only one instance during the twentieth century, following the decision of the
USSC in Oregon v. Mitchell (A. G.),3  has Congress succeeded in initiating a consti-
tutional amendment in order to modify the effect of a USSC decision. 1 Oregon
also involved a question of federalism, or Congress's power to prescribe the mini-
mum voting age for state elections, rather than (at least most directly) an issue of
constitutional rights parallel to those involving interpretation of the Charter.
Another, more contingent reason for the strong degree of finality enjoyed
by the USSC in its interpretation of the Constitution is that the Court itself has
consistently insisted upon broad and exclusive authority to determine the
meaning of constitutional rights, even in the face of dialogue by Congress. For
example, in United States v. Eichman,32 the Court considered the Flag Protection
Act,33 enacted following the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson,3' which struck
down an earlier flag burning prohibition. The Court rejected the argument that
there was a clear "'national consensus' favoring a prohibition on flag-burning"
because "any suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech
becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to
the First Amendment."
35
In (City of) Boerne v. Flores,31 the Court again held that only the USSC had
the authority to interpret, rather than enforce, the meaning of the Constitution.
The issue there conceived the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,37 which was a
response to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.3" It ruled:
30. 400 U.S. 112 (1970) [Oregon].
31. Pickerill, supra note 25 at 47-48. Three earlier instances of dialogue via Article V involved:
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment in response to the decision of the Supreme Court
in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as
a response to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); and the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment in response to Pollack v. Farmers'Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). See
discussion in Geoffrey R. Stone, "Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in
Constitutional Doctrine" (1988) 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 67.
32. 496 U.S. 310 (1990) [Eichman].
33. 18 U.S. §700 (1989).
34. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
35. Eichman, supra note 32 at 318.
36. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) [Boerne].
37. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (1993).
38. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be
enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing
what the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the power to deter-
mine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress
would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions of
[the Fourteenth Amendment].""
More recently, in Dickerson v. United States," the USSC invalidated an at-
tempt by Congress to modify the effect of the per se exclusionary rule,
established by its earlier decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 1
When it comes to attempts by state officials to engage in dialogue, the
USSC has been even more insistent on its exclusive authority to interpret the
Constitution. In Cooper v. Aaron,"2 in the context of violent disputes about the
implementation of a school desegregation order in Arkansas, the Court insisted
on the importance of executive compliance with court orders as an important
dimension to the rule of law. Furthermore, it also insisted on the general su-
premacy of the Court's interpretation of the Constitution over competing
legislative and executive interpretations. Specifically, Chief Justice Warren de-
clared that, since Marbury v. Madison," judicial supremacy had been "a
permanent and indispensable feature of [the US] constitutional system" and
that "[n]o state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the
[Court's interpretation of the] Constitution without violating his undertaking
to support it."""
Equally famous is Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey"5 and the
questions of whether and to what extent to overrule Roe v. Wade." In Casey, a
plurality of the USSC held that legislative attempts to narrow the scope of Roe
39. Boerne, supra note 36 at 519.
40. 530 U.S. 428 (2000) [Dickerson].
41. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at 444. Chief Justice Warren ruled that "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant," unless it could demonstrate that a person had been "warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed" (at 444).
42. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) [Cooper].
43. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
44. Cooper, supra note 42 at 18.
45. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) [Casey].
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [Roe].
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pointed against, rather than in favour of, the Court revisiting its abortion deci-
sions.4' As deference could be interpreted by the public as "surrendering to
political pressure," the Court should be less, not more, willing in such a water-
shed case to revisit its interpretation of the Constitution.4 8
The USSC's rigid, three-tiered approach to the standard of review also
reinforces the system of strong-form judicial review in the United States.
Where laws violate fundamental rights or fundamental interests under the equal
protection clause, or are based on a suspect classification (such as a classification
based on race), the Court applies strict scrutiny-or asks whether a law is
substantially narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest."
Where a law imposes a time, manner, or place restriction, or another content-
neutral restriction on the enjoyment of a fundamental right, or where a law is
based on a quasi-suspect classification (such, as gender), the Court applies in-
termediate scrutiny-or asks whether a law is substantially narrowly tailored to
advance an important government objective."0 In all other cases, the Court
applies a rational basis review, which asks whether a law has some rational
connection to a legitimate government purpose.5
The consequence of this three-tiered approach is that the USSC must ap-
ply the same approach to any legislative sequel--or second look case-as it did
in its first look. While individual justices can always "gloss" over the require-
ments of strict scrutiny, such scrutiny clearly requires that legislation not
unduly infringe the enjoyment of constitutional rights that have previously
been recognized by the Court in order to be valid. 2 This, in turn, makes it
more difficult for individual justices to simultaneously follow the Court's own
47. Supra note 45 at 867-69.
48. Ibid. at 867.
49. See e.g. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting as
fundamental interest); Casey, supra note 45 (reproductive privacy as fundamental right); and
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (race-based classifications).
50. See e.g. Heff-on v. International Societyfor Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (time,
manner, and/or place restrictions); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (content-
neutrality test); and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (gender discrimination).
51. See e.g. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
52. See e.g. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For a discussion of this case, see Marisa
Lopez, "Constitutional Law: Lowering the Standard of Strict Scrutiny" (2004) 56 Fla. L.
Rev. 841.
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precedents and show deference to legislative Constitutional judgments, even if
they favour doing so in order to uphold a congressional sequel.
Canadian scholars suggest that, by reason of the Charter's distinctive fea-
tures, judicial review in Canada is "weaker" than in the United States. 3
Compared to Article V of the US Constitution, section 33 of the Charter
provides a relatively undemanding mechanism by which Parliament or the
legislature may override the effect of an SCC decision interpreting the Char-
-ter. At any given time, reliance by Parliament or the provincial legislatures on
section 33 simply requires an express declaration and the support of a legisla-
tive majority.5" After five years, Parliament or the provincial legislatures must
re-enact the legislation to re-engage the override.5" Therefore, dialogue schol-
ars argue that Section 33 of the Charter creates a "big difference between
Canada and the United States." 6 Compared to the various provisions of the
US Bill of Rights,"7 which make no express provision for the limitation of
rights, section 1 of the Charter also alters the way in which the SCC ap-
proaches the assessment of the proportionality or justifiability of limitations
on rights.5 8
On closer inspection, however, the way in which dialogue scholars interpret
the significance of provisions such as sections 33 and 1 means that, in the vast
majority of cases, their theory actually provides little basis for distinguishing the
legitimacy of US style, strong-form judicial review. When it comes to section
33 of the Charter, dialogue scholars generally argue that it should be under-
stood to exhaust, not confirm, the scope for true interpretive dialogue between
53. See e.g. Peter W. Hogg, "Constitutional Dialogue Under a Bill of Rights" (2007/2008) 23
N.J.C.L. 127 at 134 [Hogg, "Bill of Rights"].
54. Charter, supra note 1, s. 33(1). This provision holds that Parliament or the legislature may
enact legislation that shall operate notwithstanding ss. 2 or 7-15.
55. Ibid., s. 33(3).
56. Hogg, "Bill of Rights," supra note 53. Compare Peter H. Russell, "Standing Up for
Notwithstanding" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 293; Paul C. Weiler, "Rights and Judges in a
Democracy: A New Canadian Vision" (1984-1985) 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 51 at 79-84.
57. U.S. Const. amend. I-X.
58. Cf. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, trans. by Julian Rivers (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002) c. 6. For examples of internal (de)limitation in the US.
Constitution, see U.S. Const. amend. V (which protects life, liberty, and property only to
the-extent of a requirement of due process).
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courts and legislatures under the Charter. 9 Thus, in the context of section 1 of
the Charter (or an equivalent clause-specific limitation), dialogue scholars claim
that legislatures are not free to engage in dialogue about the meaning of the
Charter itself, but only about the way in which the Charter relates to particular
policy objectives.
In their 1997 article, Hogg and Bushell argue that, in this context, it is for
the courts to interpret the meaning of Charter rights and for legislatures to re-
spect "the Charter values ... identified by the [c]ourt[s]," while continuing to
pursue their prior policy objectives.6" In Charter Dialogue Revisited, Hogg,
Bushell Thornton, and Wright make this division of responsibility between
courts and legislatures even more explicit. Under their view, while legislatures
remain responsible for determining how to achieve social and economic policy
objectives, they "may not act on an interpretation of the Charter which conflicts
with an interpretation provided by the courts."61 Other dialogue scholars, such
as Kent Roach, also see dialogue as "an interchange ... between judges and leg-
islators in which the former focus on rights and the latter are allowed to explain
why they believe it is necessary to limit rights in the circumstances."62
The difficulty for dialogue scholars, given this view of section 33, is that in
the thirty-seven years in which the Charter has been in operation, there has only
been one case in which the notwithstanding clause has been used to override a
decision by the SCC under the Charter.63 That instance involved the SCC's
decision in Ford v. Quebec (A. G.)64 and the decision by the Quebec legislature
to reinstate a preference for French-only, as opposed to bilingual, signs in the
province.6" Parliament has never invoked section 33 of the Charter, and provincial
59. See e.g. Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2 at 36; Roach, "Common Law,"
supra note 2 at 487.
60. Supra note 2 at 79.
61. Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2 at 3, 33.
62. Roach, "Canadian Experience," supra note 2 at 543.
63. Compare Jamie Cameron, "The Charter's Legislative Override: Feat or Figment of the
Constitutional Imagination?" in Huscroft & Brodie, supra note 17 at 135.
64. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [Ford].
65. See Bill 178, An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54, s. 10.
Thereafter, the Quebec legislature repealed its own attempt at dialogue by passing legislation
that was designed to give much broader effect to the decision of the SCC in Ford, ibid.,
suggesting that a more narrowly tailored alternative to French-only signage laws would b6
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legislatures have used it only fifteen times in addition to its usage in connection
with Ford. Twelve of those further instances also involved Quebec.66 Peter
Hogg suggests that this is because "public opinion outside Quebec has not been
deeply disturbed by decisions of the Court," at least when compared to the US
public's reaction to decisions such as Lochner v. New York,6 7 or Roe.6" The diffi-
culty with this view, however, is that it tends to imply only the narrowest of
differences between judicial review in Canada and the United States.
Concerns about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in the United
States are far from confined to decisions such as Lochner or Roe, where the
USSC adopted a sweeping view of the due process clause in direct tension with
the constitutional understandings of a large number of Americans.69 Those con-
cerns extend to a much larger number of decisions in which the USSC has
frustrated a national majority in its interpretation of the constitution.
Nor is it true that the SCC's Charter decisions have been met with universal,
popular approval. Take, for example, the decisions of the SCC in R. v. Seaboyer7'
and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A. G.)," which struck down, as incompatible
with the Charter, certain respective "rape-shield" and tobacco advertising provi-
sions, respectively. In both cases, the SCC's decision met strong opposition from
women's groups and public health organizations, not to mention the public at
large.72 This opposition was not limited to the result, but also extended to the
Court's approach to Charter interpretation. In Seaboyer, women's groups argued
that, by failing to recognize the relevance of the complainant's equality rights to
the justifiability of the provisions under challenge, the SCC took too narrow a
view of the scope of the constitutional value-ordering that is created by section
laws requiring French to be "present and predominant" on all signs. See Bill 86, An Act to
Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1993, c. 4 0, s. 18 (Bill 86).
66. See Tsvi Kahana, "The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from
the Ignored Practice of Section 33 of the Charter" (2001) 44 Can. Pub. Admin. J. 255 at
256-58 [Kahana, "Section 33"].
67. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) [Lochner].
68. See Hogg, "Bill of Rights," supra note 53 at 135.
69. See David A. Strauss, "Why Was Lochner Wrong?" (2003) 70 U. Chicago L. Rev. 373.
70. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 [Seaboyer].
71. [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [RJR-MacDonalA].
72. See Janet L. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament's Role? (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2002) at 85, 93 [Hiebert, Charter Conflicts].
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15(1) of the Charter.73 In RJR-MacDonald, public health advocates argued that
the SCC should not have treated tobacco advertising as speech or granted tobacco
companies the standing to assert Charter rights.7" In these and other cases, it is
difficult to accept, as Hogg suggests, that the threshold of disagreement was not
sufficient to engage section 33.
When it comes to section 1 of the Charter, dialogue scholars have tended
to approach this provision in a way that creates little relevant difference be-
tween Canada and the United States. For the most part, they suggest that the
significance of section 1 (and of guarantees with internal limitations) is that it
discourages an absolutist approach to the definition of rights.75 If rights are
subject to reasonable limits, there is great scope for dialogue between courts
and legislatures about the ways in which rights and policy objectives should
be balanced.7"
One difficulty with this approach is that it misconceives its American coun-
terpart. In fact, there are few areas in which the USSC has adopted anything like
an absolutist approach to the protection of constitutional rights." Even in the
context of the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the USSC-with the
notable exception of Justices Black and Douglas-has consistently adopted a
non-absolutist approach to the scope of the guarantee of speech.
A more promising path emphasizes the degree to which section 1 creates
greater "flexibility for legislative sequels than ... the American Bill of Rights
73. See e.g. Elizabeth J. Shilton & Anne S. Derrick, "Sex Equality and Sexual Assault: In the
Aftermath of Seaboyer" (1991) 11 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 107 at 118-19; Lois G.
MacDonald, "Promoting Social Equality through the Legislative Override" (1994) 4
N.J.C.L. 1.
74. RJR-MacDonald, supra note 71. For arguments to this effect, see e.g. Hiebert, Charter
Conflicts, supra note 72 at 80-82.
75. See Roach, "Canadian Experience," supra nte 2 at 541.
76. Compare Hogg & Bushell, supra note 2 at 82; ibid.
77. See Mark Tushnet, "Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World" (2003) 52
U.T.L.J. 89 at 93; Jeremy Webber, "Institutional Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures
in the Definition of Fundamental Rights: Lessons from Canada (and Elsewhere)" in
Wojciech Sadurski, ed., Constitutionaljustice, East and West: Democratic Legitimacy and
Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective (Massachusetts:
Kluwer Law International, 2002) 61. See also Andrew S. Butler, "Limiting Rights" (2002)
33 V.U.W.L.R. 113 at 116; Stephen Gardbaum, "Limiting Constitutional Rights" (2007)
54 UCLA L. Rev. 789 at 805.
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without a limitation clause."78 The Court has also subsequently indicated that
these requirements are to be applied in a context-sensitive way, with proper
regard, among other things, to whether the government is seeking (via
particular legislation) to protect vulnerable groups or to otherwise promote
Charter values." At least as it has been interpreted over the years, the SCC's
Oakes test represents a significantly more generalized, "floating" approach to
assessing the proportionality of limitations on rights than a US style test of
strict (or even intermediate) scrutiny.80 The second, minimal impairment
limb of the Oakes proportionality requirement is also generally (in the way it
is applied) a less demanding requirement than the equivalent requirement of
narrow tailoring (or substantial narrow tailoring) that is applied in the United
States. This means that, when it comes to assessing the compatibility of a
legislative sequel with the Charter, Canadian justices enjoy greater flexibility
than their US counterparts to uphold such sequels, consistent with their own
court's prior precedents.
It is curious that dialogue theorists do not ultimately permit Canadian
justices to use this flexibility to promote a more dialogic approach to review.
Notably, they argue that courts "should not approach second look cases any dif-
ferently than they approach first look cases"8 but are always required to "decide
cases according to their view of the law."82 Any other approach, Hogg claims,
"would be offensive to the judicial function."83 According to this view, legislative
sequels that challenge the SCC's interpretation of the Charter will be rendered
invalid, unless there is a change in the composition of the Court, or broader social
changes persuade justices to revisit their own prior decisions. This, in turn, is ex-
actly what happens in the United States-though there is mandatory retirement
for SCC judges, but not for members of the USSC, which tends somewhat to
increase relative turnover on the SCC.
84
78. Hogg, "Bill of Rights," supra note 53 at 134.
79. See Janet Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma ofJudicial Review (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1995) at 61-71 [Hiebert, Limiting Rights].
80. Ibid. For an elaboration of the test, see R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [Oakes].
81. Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2 at 47-48.
82. Roach, "Dialogic Review," supra note 2 at 51.
83. See Peter W. Hogg, "Discovering Dialogue" in Huscroft & Brodie, supra note 17 at 5.
84. See Thomas R. Klassen & C.T. Gillin, "The Heavy Hand of the Law: The Canadian
Supreme Court and Mandatory Retirement" (1999) 18 Can. J. Aging 259. On the US
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II. DIALOGUE AS COMPROMISE: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DEFERENCE
For dialogue theory to live up to its promise of distinguishing US style con-
cerns about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review, a new account of
sections 1 and 33-and of dialogue-is required.
A. NEW DIALOGUE AND DEFERENCE (EXPCST]
In the new account of dialogue, the key to distinguishing Canadian from US
style review will be the understanding that, in second look cases-such as those
that are equivalent to Eichman, Boerne, or Dickerson-the SCC should show
some degree of deference, under section 1, to the measures adopted by legisla-
tors. It also requires that, in order to reconcile a showing of ex post deference
with the less deferential approach taken in an earlier case, the SCC should be
willing either to overrule that earlier case or to engage in a form of narrow re-
statement (or narrow statement expost).
The idea of a narrow judicial statement ex ante is familiar to common law
lawyers in both Canada and the United States as a means by which courts may
increase the scope for legislators to revise the ongoing, practical effect of their
decisions. The key benefit to a narrow statement ex ante, in this context, is that
it signals clearly to Parliament and the provincial legislatures that there is space
to adopt a different interpretation of the Charter in future cases.
The idea of narrow statement expost builds on this idea by asking members
of the SCC to apply that concept to a second look case. In other words, they
would uphold a legislative sequel under a narrow statement of the first look de-
cision as both reasonable and also consistent with that decision. But if the
legislative sequel could not be saved by a narrow statement of the earlier deci-
sion, the first look decision would prevail. Narrow restatement of this kind will
also have a central role to play in new dialogue theory because overruling a deci-
sion will generally be unnecessary (and therefore undesirable), given that the
SCC's interpretation of the Charter was itself premised-at least implicitly-on
position, see e.g. Stephen B. Burbank, "The Selection, Tenure, and Extrajudicial Authority
of the Chief Justice and Other Justices - Alternative Career Resolution I: Changing the
Tenure of Supreme Court Justices" (2006) 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1511.
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the understanding that a legislative sequel might take the form of a disagree-
ment with a SCC decision.
8 5
The main reason, in new dialogue theory, for insisting on such expost def-
erence under section 1 is that section 33 does not provide a realistic alternative
avenue for ordinary, as opposed to extraordinary, interpretive dialogue.86 One
reason for this is the historic link between the use of section 33 and Quebec's
demands for recognition as a "distinct society." Not only did the first remedial
use of section 33 occur in this context, 87 but, as many other commentators have
noted, in both instances the Quebec legislature relied on section 33 in a way
that was both widely noticed and deeply unpopular in the rest of Canada.88
Quebec's use of the override was an important factor in the 1987 Constitutional
Accord (Meech Lake Accord), which recognized Quebec as a "distinct society"
within Canada.89 Subsequent use of the power has also, for most Canadians,
simply confirmed the link between section 33 and Quebec's demands to be
treated as a distinct society, exempting itself from broader Canadian constitu-
tional commitments and thereby making it extremely costly for Parliament and
Anglophone legislatures to contemplate using section 33 as a means of engaging*
in dialogue.98
Even if this history did not exist, section 33 would still be an unlikely vehi-
cle for routine legislative dialogue under new dialogue theory. By creating a
broad power to override Charter rights, section 33 provides legislators with a
natural vehicle for setting limits on the extent to which rights apply to particu-
lar cases or circumstances--or for expressing what Jeremy Waldron has called
85. Contra Cameron, supra note 63 at 164 (arguing that, at the very least, considerations of
transparency favour the Court explicitly overruling its prior precedent in such cases).
86. Section 1 provides a natural textual basis, or hook, for such an approach in Canada.
According to new dialogue theory, however, it is not necessary for such a hook to exist in
order for judicial expost deference or narrow statement to be desirable. In principle, the
lessons of new dialogue theory also apply to the United States, which lacks any textual hook
or confirmation of such an approach.
87. See Kahana, supra note 66.
88. See Hiebert, Limiting Rights, supra note 79 at 140; Tushnet, "Policy Distortion," supra note
4 at 292.
89. Ibid. See ConstitutionalAccord, online: <http://www.parl.gc.calinformation/library/prbpubs/
bp406.htm#A.%2OThe%2OMeech>.
90. Kahana, "Section 33," supra note 66. Kahana discusses the sixteen instances in which s. 33
has been used (at 257-59).
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"misgivings" about the application of rights. 91 It provides a much less natural
vehicle by which Parliament or the legislature can express disagreement with
the SCC about the content or priority of Charter rights in particular, concrete
circumstances ("rights disagreements"). 92 In such cases, if Parliament or the leg-
islature is to invoke section 33 in aid of dialogue, it will be required, to some
degree, to misrepresent the nature and scope of its disagreement with the SCC.
By making legislators seem less trustworthy, misrepresentation of this kind will
also tend to make it far more difficult for legislators to persuade the public that,
in seeking to engage in dialogue, they are motivated by principled disagreement
with the SCC, and not just by pure political expediency. This, in turn, can
mean that the political price of dialogue for Parliament or the legislature ex-
ceeds the benefits that are derived from achieving a more democratic and
responsive Charter outcome.
For this reason, new dialogue theory holds that, while section 33 of the
Charter will be important to dialogue, its role will tend to be largely back-
ground in nature. The most important function of section 33 will be to give the
SCC greater incentive to adhere to a commitment to ex post deference. Given
the simple mechanism for applying section 33, if the SCC declines to defer to
Parliament or the legislature in second look cases, there is at least some prospect
that Parliament or the legislature will decide to override wholly the Court's in-
terpretation of the Charter in favour of its own preferred interpretation.93 If
members of the SCC are in any way "constitutional maximizers," they will have
much greater incentive than justices in the United States to defer to legislative
sequels that take some account of their preferred constitutional vision.9 ' If they
show such deference, they can be fairly confident that their preferred Charter
91. Waldron, "Models," supra note 17 at 9-18.
92. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, "Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy" in Tom
Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone, eds., Protecting Human Rights:
Instruments and Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 263; ibid. at 35-37.
93. This assumes, of course, that, while the use of s. 33 has been rare, there is no established
convention against its use. Contra Howard Leeson, "Section 33, the Notwithstanding
Clause: A Paper Tiger?" (2000) 6:4 CHOICES 3 at 20, online: <http://www.irpp.org/
choices/archive/vol6no4.pdf>.
94. For examples of US scholarship that treat judges in this way, see Lewis A. Kornhauser.&
Lawrence G. Sager, "The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts" (1993) 81
Cal. L. Rev. 1; Adrian Vermeule, "The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory
and the Fallacy of Division" (2005) 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 549.
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interpretation will have some influence. If they strike down Parliament's or the
legislature's attempt at dialogue, they run a risk, not only of losing influence in
a particular area of Charter interpretation, but also of losing influence more
generally, in the eyes of the public. If members of the Court are at all risk averse
about constitutional outcomes, they will have a clear incentive to defer to rea-
sonable legislative sequels. By contrast, members of the USSC have every
incentive in second look cases to insist upon their own uniquely preferred in-
terpretation of the constitution because the chances of reversal are smaller.
A second important function of section 33 in new dialogue theory will be
to provide valuable textual confirmation to the SCC of the desirability of
adopting a commitment to ex post deference under the Charter. In this sense,
section 33 will serve much the same function vis-ci-vis section 1 (and other in-
ternal limitation clauses) as section 15(2) of the Charter does with respect to
section 15(1)-i.e., it provides a helpful cue to the SCC of the preferability of
one interpretation of the nature and structure of a particular Charter provision
over another.9" Admittedly, section 33 will not provide a perfect textual cue to
the SCC in this context, given its connection to the idea of rights misgivings as
opposed to rights disagreements and its potential to be read as either confirm-
ing or exhausting the proper scope for dialogue under the Charter. However,
section 33 will again have much in common with parallel provisions, such as
section 15(2), which has also been interpreted by the SCC to involve some poten-
tial ambiguity.96 Therefore, while the notwithstanding clause cannot ensure that a
justice will adopt a particular, preferred dialogic approach to the process of justifi-
cation under section 1, it can, like section 15(2), provide valuable textual support
for a justice who is adopting such an approach, if she or he deems it desirable.
In this context, a related function served by section 33 is to confirm to the
SCC that the deference required of it in second look cases is not unlimited. The
precise limits that apply to expost deference may not exactly mirror the limits to
section 33, but they will tend to be closely parallel. In fact, the very existence of
limits in the latter context will also provide valuable additional confirmation to
the SCC that there should be some limits in the former.
95. See Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 905 at paras. 105108 [Lovelace] (holding that s.
15(2) confirms the substantive nature of the equality guarantee found in s. 15(1) of the
Charter, rather than establishing a special or exhaustive provision to govern the
constitutionality of affirmative action measures).
96. Ibid
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One such limit, for example, will be the requirement that a legislative se-
quel be within the outer bounds of reasonable interpretations of the Charter
(or that it should not be patently unreasonable). This reflects the fact that
strong-form judicial review is problematic to the extent that there is scope for
reasonable disagreement among Canadians about what the text, history, and
normative values that underpin the Charter entail in particular cases. The
moment that such disagreement ceases to be reasonable, according to any
plausible interpretive theory, democratic objections to the SCC that have fi-
nal authority to interpret the Charter, according to that theory, also
disappear.
A second limit stems from the understanding that, ideally, norms of in-
terpretive deference should be reciprocated between the courts and the
legislatures. This helps to ensure that, where the public favours some form of
compromise between competing Charter values (or public rights and policy
concerns), the path to achieving such a compromise is as smooth as possible.
Absent a norm of mutual deference between judges and legislators, the path
to long-term constitutional stability will tend to involve sharp swings
between differing judicial and legislative constitutional interpretations,
pending the ultimate "resolution" of such disagreements by Canadians via
electoral or other means. The legislative branch could consistently pass the
most extreme, "in your face" legislative sequels, which have effect for some
period of time, and the SCC could consistently strike down these statutes
and thereby restore the legal status quo, pending passage of another sequel.97
This type of behaviour undermines legal stability and predictability in a way
that is neither necessary nor desirable from a dialogic perspective. As a result,
dialogue theory favours a more controlled process of interpretive exchange
under the Charter, whereby both judges and legislators commit to modify,
wherever possible, (rather than to wholly disregard) the interpretations of the
other branch.98
97. For the idea of "in your face" replies, see Roach, "Common Law," supra note 2.
98. Compare T.R.S. Allan, "Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review"
(2003) 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 563 at 571; Dawn E. Johnsen, "Presidential Non-
Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes" (2000) 63 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 7 at 36.
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B. NEW DIALOGUE, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, AND CHARTER
CONVERSATION COMPARED
By emphasizing the importance of judicial deference and narrow statement ex
post under section 1 of the Charter, new dialogue theory gives Canadian courts
maximum flexibility ex ante to counter blockages in the legislative process that
might otherwise impair the enjoyment of Charter rights."
I have suggested elsewhere that reasonable disagreement about the meaning
of constitutional rights means that, in most cases, a court such as the SCC can-
not legitimately seek to enforce a wholly freestanding historical or moral
conception of Charter rights. This does not mean, however, that the Court's
role under the Charter is necessarily insignificant, given the range of potential
blockages in the legislative process that surround the protection of Charter
rights.' Because legislative processes in Canada are frequently subject to block-
ages, such as those caused by "blind spots" and "burdens of inertia," Canadians
will often be prevented from enjoying even those Charter rights that a majority
of citizens would be willing to grant them.'
Legislative blind spots alone can take at least three distinct forms. They can
relate to the application of laws to particular cases in a way that limits rights
99. As a result, some critics may, of course, regard new dialogue as supporting an unduly activist
approach to judicial review ex ante. See e.g. Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly,
"Misrepresenting the Supreme Court's Record? A Comment on Sujit Choudry and Claire E.
Hunter, 'Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada"' (2004) 49 McGill
L.J. 741.
100. See Rosalind Dixon, "Creating Dialogue About Socio-economic Rights: Strong-form Versus
Weak-form Judicial Review Revisited" (2007) 5 ICON. 391 [Dixon, "Socio-economic"]. In
this sense, new dialogue theory is, to some degree, an inheritor to "representation-
reinforcing" approaches to judicial review. See e.g. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory ofjudicialReview (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). At the same
time, by emphasizing the pervasive existence of reasonable disagreement and rejecting any
strict process/substantive distinction whereby procedural values are understood to be free of
such disagreement, new dialogue theory frees itself from some of the analytic failings of pure
procedural theories. For criticisms of the theory on this ground, see Laurence H. Tribe, "The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories" (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 1063 at
1063-65, 1067-79. In doing so, it aligns itself more closely with the idea that judicial review is
providing a valuable additional veto/initiation point for the protection of rights. Compare
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Core of an Uneasy Casefor Judicial Review" (2008) 121 Harv.
L. Rev. 1693 (emphasizing the idea of courts as an additional veto point only).
101. For the introduction of these concepts, see Dixon, "Socio-economic," ibid.
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(blind spots of application), to certain perspectives not directly represented in
the legislature (blind spots of perspective), and to opportunities for low-cost
accommodation of rights claims (blind spots of accommodation). Each form of
blind spot will arise for somewhat different reasons, including time constraints,
expertise, diversity, or the focus of legislators.
Blind spots of application will often arise simply as a result of time con-
straints on legislators. When legislators are required to consider hundreds of
bills in any given session, as well as perform constituency-related functions,
they will often lack time to study individual pieces of legislation in detail. In
other cases, blind spots of application can arise even where legislators do turn
their minds to a particular issue because legislators, like all of us, are subject to
forms of bounded rationality and will therefore have limited foresight about the
full range of circumstances in which a law may impair rights in the future.
Blind spots of perspective will arise in Canadian legislatures wherever a
group lacks "descriptive" representation in the legislature and legislators lack
the appropriate incentive or mechanism for reaching out to these excluded
voices." 2 In some cases, limits of this kind will be the product of deliberate,
formal restrictions on the franchise (such as those that exist in the case of non-
citizens and which used to exist for prisoners.)'0 3 In other cases, these limits will
be the product of electoral dynamics. As a result, political parties will have little
incentive to select a diverse range of candidates with perspectives that are very
different from those of the median voter. In each case, legislators will often have
limited incentive to engage with the arguments and experiences of such groups,
and, in any event, they will find that they have few institutional opportunities
for such engagement.
Blind spots of accommodation, in turn, can arise in legislative processes as
a consequence of limits on both the time and the expertise of legislators. Such
limitations often lead legislators to delegate the task of identifying appropriate
rights protections to the minister who is responsible for particular legislation or
to a legislative sub-committee, even when these legislators themselves often lack
the experience that is necessary in order to craft appropriate rights protections.
They also tend to have a disproportionate interest in achieving the relevant leg-
102. On the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin,
The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
103. See infia note 178.
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islative objective in a way that can lead them to overlook opportunities for the
accommodation of rights, even if such accommodations represent only a mini-
mal cost to the legislature's policy aims."'
In many cases, legislative blind spots can also intersect with subsequent
legislative inertia in a way that prevents the ongoing correction of earlier over-
sights. Inertia of this kind can take at least three distinct forms and impede
legislative responsiveness to broader changes in constitutional understandings.
Legislative burdens of inertia can be the product of competing legislative priori-
ties (priority-driven inertia), competing factions within political parties in the
legislature (coalition-driven inertia), and bureaucratic delay on the part of the
executive, combined with poor oversight by legislatures (compound inertia).
Priority-driven inertia can arise because capacity constraints on legislatures, at
both levels of government, cause legislators to prioritize demands for action
that benefit a large number of citizens and neglect the demands of minorities,
even where those demands find tacit support from a much larger majority.
Coalition-driven forms of inertia can arise in a different set of circum-
stances, where legislative behaviour is dominated by partisan political
considerations. Against such a background, divisions within political parties
over a Charter issue may cause legislators to avoid addressing that issue, even
where there is fairly clear majority support for legislative change in the
broader constitutional culture. In Canada, as in most constitutional democracies,
affiliation with a major political party is extremely important to a legislator's
chances of election; legislators, therefore, have a strong interest in promoting
both the actual and the apparent coherence of their party. That coherence can
also be threatened where a Charter issue divides a party internally. In these
circumstances, party leaders face two broad options: either allow a free vote
* among party members on the basis of their conscience, or impose party discipline
on members in the minority. Both options can be costly for the coherence of
the party. Allowing a conscience vote can undermine the public. perception of
solidarity, but imposing party discipline can erode the internal cohesion of a
party; if such discipline is imposed frequently enough, members of a minority
faction may no longer feel it is in their interest to remain part of the broad,
104. There are, of course, attempts to change this by introducing new legislative committee
structures with specific responsibility for human rights issues. See e.g. Janet L. Hiebert, "New
Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When
Interpreting Rights?" (2004) 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1963 at 1978.
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party-based coalition."' 5 Faced with this catch-22, legislators may therefore
decide to keep an issue off the agenda-even in the face of demands for legal
change from the broader constitutional culture.1 6 The strategic question is
whether the short-term electoral gains of greater legislative responsiveness out-
weigh the damage to party coherence.
Alternatively, compound forms of inertia have the potential to arise wherever
the realization of a Charter right requires some form of positive action from the
executive. Where this is the case, time constraints, competing priorities, and defi-
ance on the part of executive officials can mean that changes that advance rights
are substantially delayed.' 7 Legislatures, with their own competing priorities, can
fail to counter or punish such bureaucratic inertia where it arises. However, none
of these blockages need be insurmountable in a constitutional system such as
Canada's, which provides for broad judicial review.
All Canadian courts, not merely the SCC, will be well placed to identify
blockages, such as those caused by blind spots of application. The fact that
Canadian courts generally hear cases on a concrete, case-by-case basis means
that they have ample opportunity to consider the application of laws to par-
ticular circumstances. Judges at higher levels of appeal will also, by virtue of
prior experience in practice or in lower courts, be highly skilled at identifying
the kinds of procedural protection or narrow substantive exceptions to laws that
could be adopted at low cost to a particular legislative objective, thereby over-
coming existing blind spots of accommodation. When it comes to burdens of
inertia, appellate judges in particular will also have a range of sources available
to them--domestic and foreign-that can help them to identify the degree of
popular support for a particular Charter claim.00 Given their powers under the
105. See Tushnet, "New Forms," supra note 22 at 834.
106. See Mark A. Graber, "The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary" (1993) 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35 at 40; F.L. Morton, "Dialogue or Monologue?"
in Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) 111.
107. Consider the gap in this context between changes in popular understandings of the rights of
domestic violence victims and changes in police practices in many localities. See e.g. B.M. v.
British Columbia (A.G.), [2001] 105 A.C.W.S. (3d) 962.
108. For a critical evaluation of these different sources, see Rosalind Dixon, "A Democratic
Theory of Constitutional Comparison" (2008) 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 947 [Dixon,
"Democratic Theory"].
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Charter, Canadian courts will also have a broad range of tools available to them
with which to counter such blockages, once identified.
The coercive remedial powers that Canadian courts enjoy by virtue of sec-
tion 24(1) of the Charter gives them the direct ability to counter almost all forms
of legislative blind spot, simply by striking down or modifying the effect of
legislation in a particular case."0 9 These powers also mean that, compared to
purely political interventions made by social movements or human rights com-
missions, judicial interventions in the name of the Charter provide legislators with
a greater incentive to address a previously neglected issue. If they do not, it is
likely that courts themselves will address the issue in a way that legislators find
less appealing. The communicative aspect of courts' reasoning also gives them
an extremely valuable, additional tool with which to counter both legislative
blind spots and burdens of inertia: appellate courts, and particularly the SCC,
generally provide much readier access to national media attention for rights
claimants than do direct, popular attempts at constitutional change.11 In doing
so, they provide a powerful tool for countering both blind spots of perspective
and coalition-driven forms of inertia.
Different approaches to weakening the finality of the SCC's interpretations
of the Charter, however, imply varying degrees of constraint on the capacity of
the SCC to use these tools with a view to countering such blockages. As a
logical matter, there are two predominant ways, other than via expost deference,
by which the Court could weaken the finality of its decisions without Parlia-
ment or the legislature resorting to the application of section 33. One option
would be for the SCC to adopt a much narrower approach to the scope of
judicial review ex ante. Another option would be for it to accept that Parlia-
ment and the provincial legislatures may disregard its decision, or treat it as
lacking binding force."' The first option is generally associated with theories of
109. By "coercive," I do not mean to suggest that courts literally have the power to enforce their
judgments via coercive means. I mean simply to suggest that they have the power to issue
mandatory legal commands or directives that, in a system in which court orders are generally
obeyed, will be given coercive effect by the executive in due course.
110. For evidence in the US context to this effect, see Roy B. Flemming, B. Dan Wood & John
Bohte, "Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of
American Policy Agendas" (1999) 61 J. Pol. 76 at 84. Compare also Roach, "Dialogic
Review," supra note 2 at 54.
111. Another option would be to make judicial review even narrower and more deferential ex
ante, and limited to cases in which the approach adopted by Parliament or provincial
262 (2009147 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
"judicial minimalism" that have been proposed by scholars such as Cass Sun-
stein and Patrick Monahan in the United States and Canada, respectively.,
2
In the United States, the second option is associated with the idea of depart-
mentalism,"' while it is connected in the United Kingdom to the idea of
judicial review as "conversation."''.
Theoretically, all three approaches are capable of responding to the possi-
bility that, in seeking to counter perceived legislative blockages, Canadian
courts may sometimes misjudge the degree of democratic support for, or practi-
cal effect of, recognizing a Charter right. Especially when compared to the
predominant understanding of judicial review in the United States, each approach
ensures that decisions of the SCC are at least fairly open to revision by Parliament
or the legislature. The advantages of new dialogue theory are that it preserves
the maximum scope possible for review ex ante-thereby countering blockages
in the legislative process-and adopts a more deferential position expost.
Compared to judicial minimalism, new dialogue theory gives Canadian
courts much greater flexibility in first look cases to determine whether to engage
in broad versus narrow (and therefore also shallow versus deep) forms of rea-
soning ex ante."' By doing so, it gives courts greater ability to use persuasion
legislatures was patently unreasonable, or "clearly in error." See e.g. Thayer, supra note 4.
Such an approach would, however, be both strongly contrary to existing SCC practice and
far from a true compromise between full-scale judicial and legislative responsibility for
interpreting the Charter.
112. See Sunstein, supra note 20.
113. For a definition of departmentalism, see e.g. Michael Stokes Paulsen, "The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is" (1994) 83 Geo. L.J. 217; Mark Tushnet,
"Alternative Forms of Judicial Review" (2003) 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2781; and Keith E.
Whittington, "Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses"
(2002) 80 N.C.L. Rev. 773 at 783.
114. See e.g. Francesca Kug, Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the United Kingdom's New Bill
of Rights (London: Penguin Books, 2000). Conversational theories have also been advocated
in the United States. See Robert W. Bennett, "Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of
Difficulty" (2001) 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 845. In Canada, see Tsvi Kahana, "Understanding the
Notwithstanding Mechanism" (2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 221.
115. If courts are to reason narrowly, they must also reason in a "shallow" way. See Sunstein,
supra note 20 at 16-19 (noting that there are few decided cases that even attempt to combine
narrow and deep reasoning, given the tension between the two demands). In Canada, see e.g.
R v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at para. 258 (seeking expressly to leave scope for
Parliament to respond to the decision of the Court to strike down s. 251 of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 [Criminal Code, 1970], by holding that "the precise point in the
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as a tool for promoting the enjoyment of rights. In many cases, persuasion of
this kind will allow courts to address legislative blockages, such as those caused
by blind spots of perspective and accommodation, or by priority-driven bur-
dens of inertia. Blockages of this kind will often arise in a consistent, closely
related pattern across different settings. Court decisions that seek to counter
such blockages via case-specific, coercive means will tend to leave undisturbed a
large number of other statutes that embody parallel blockages. In contrast,
those that persuade legislators to give increased attention to a particular rights
argument, concern, or issue-in more systemic terms-are likely to have a
much broader impact on overall blind spots or inertia of this kind.116
In comparison to conversational and departmental theories, new dialogue
theory gives Canadian courts greater capacity to address legislative blockages,
particularly those caused by the most persistent coalition-driven and compound
inertia. Unlike conversational theories that limit the courts' review choices, new
dialogue theory gives courts broad power-through remedies-to directly
counter such inertia." 7 In the face of such inertia, it allows them to create a
new, more democratically responsive legal equilibrium with the expectation
that, unless the Court clearly misjudges democratic constitutional understand-
ings, this new equilibrium will endure for some period of time.
Unlike departmental theory, new dialogue theory also gives Canadian
courts a much broader capacity to indirectly counter such inertia by further in-
sisting that, whatever remedial orders courts do issue, such orders should be
treated as (at least narrowly) binding against both legislators and executive offi-
cials. It ensures that, whether courts issue a suspended declaration of invalidity
development of the foetus at which the state's interest in its protection becomes 'compelling'
I leave to the informed judgment of the legislature").
116. Consider M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 147, 72-73 [M. v. H.] for an example in
which the Court used a clear combination of both coercive and persuasive tools and issued a
suspended declaration of invalidity, at para. 147; also for overtly normative language, with an
apparent view to countering such blockages, when considering the range of contextual factors
relevant to analysis under s. 15(1), at paras. 72-73.
117. In a conversational understanding (since the Court's role is simply to deliberate and not to
decide) countering legislative inertia is, according to Robert Bennett, "of no particular
moment." Bennett, supra note 114 at 892. In new dialogue theory, by contrast, the capacity
of Canadian courts to counter such inertia will be extremely important to their ability to
promote a more expansive interpretation of Charter rights that is consistent with respecting
reasonable disagreement among Canadians about the meaning of the Charter.
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or a mandatory injunction setting a timeframe for legislative or executive action,
the court's intervention necessarily alters the incentives facing legislators when
deciding whether to address a particularly controversial or complex Charter
issue. Without a binding time frame for addressing such an issue, legislators
with competing priorities or strong internal disagreements will have little reason
to give increased attention to a particular issue. But when such a timeframe is
backed by the threat of legislative invalidation or contempt of court, judicial
intervention will create strong incentives for at least some legislators with a
particular interest in, or responsibility for, an issue.
Another argument for new dialogue theory over rival minimalist, conversa-
tional, or departmental approaches is that this approach fits more easily within
the structure of the Charter, as well as with the actual history of Charter review in
Canada.'18 In the United States, there is some historical support for departmental
understandings, given that it is far from clear that the framers of the Constitution
intended to establish judicial supremacy, at least at the expense of Congress. Fur-
thermore, as Larry Kramer has shown, there was also a long period in the
nineteenth century during which the president, Congress, and state officials ac-
tively exercised their "departmental" authority to interpret the Constitution." 9
In the United Kingdom, where conversational theories have gained the
most attention, defining the court's role in purely communicative terms also
makes some sense at the level of fit, given the constraints of the Human Rights
Act 1998 (HRA)."2 ' Section 3 of the HRA provides that British courts have an
obligation "so far as it is possible to do so [to] read and giv[e] effect [to legisla-
tion] in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights." Section 4
provides that where a compatible reading is impossible, courts may make a
"declaration of incompatibility." Such a declaration does not, in turn, "affect
the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of
which it is given, and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which
it is made."12" ' As a result, a section 4 declaration may plausibly be considered
conversational, rather than legally binding.
118. On notions of "fit" generally, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1977) at 110-18.
119. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
120. (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 [HRA]. See e.g. Kug, supra note 114.
121. HRA, ibid., s. 4(6).
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In contrast, due to Canada's history and the structure of the Charter, it is
less appropriate to treat Canadian courts' decisions as lacking binding legal
force. By the time the Charter was adopted in 1982, it was accepted that
court decisions are legally binding against other branches of government, at
least in the narrow sense that other branches must respect the decisions of
courts as the final word on the rights and liabilities of individual parties be-
fore them, rather than the more general legal issues raised by a case.'22 Section
52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, empowers Canadian courts to invalidate
unconstitutional legislation. Therefore, it also makes less sense to treat the
role of Canadian courts as primarily persuasive or communicative, rather than
coercive. 123
If one considers the SCC's approach to Charter review since 1982, it is
clear that members of the Court have frequently departed from a strictly mini-
malist, narrow, and shallow approach to judicial reasoning ex ante. Take the
approach of the SCC in cases in which it invalidates a law for inconsistency
with section 1 of the Charter. Truly narrow reasoning in such cases would
involve an exclusive focus by the SCC on the minimal impairment limb of the
Oakes test (i.e., the question of whether a law limited a protected right as little
as possible). Unlike a finding that a law lacked an appropriately important ob-
jective or failed the rational basis test, such a finding would not in any way
suggest that Parliament or the legislature was precluded from closely re-enacting
the measure. Similarly, unlike a finding about ultimate proportionality, such a
finding would also avoid comment on what would be required for legislation to
pass muster in a second look situation.
122. Compare Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2 at 28. Unlike Hogg, Bushell
Thornton & Wright, I do not think that this practice necessarily extended to requiring
legislators to give full effect to a court's reasoning as it might apply to future cases. See e.g.
Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. 'Attorney General of Canada, [198011 S.C.R. 914 [Labatt]
(striking down federal Food and Drug labeling requirements under a narrow conception of
what constituted regulation affecting the nation as a whole); R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada
Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 at paras. 34-40 (upholding 1981 amendments to the Ocean
Dumping ControlAct, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 55, and implying a broader reading by Parliament
than by the SCC in Labatt of the relevant limb of the trade and commerce power). For a
discussion of Zellberbach, see James C. MacPherson, "Economic Regulation and the British
North America Act- Labat Breweries and Other Constitutional Imbroglios" (1981) 5 Can.
Bus. L.J. 172; Peter W. Hogg, "Comment on James MacPherson's Paper on Economic
Regulation and the British North America Act" (1981) 5 Can. Bus. L.J. 220.
123. See Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
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The SCC, however, has rarely chosen to rely exclusively on this limb of the
Oakes test. While the minimal impairment test has been critical, the Court has
also emphasized multiple bases of potential invalidity when striking down legis-
lation. Between 1986 and 1997, Leon E. Trakman, William Cole-Hamilton,
and Sean Gatien found that in nine per cent and sixteen per cent of cases,
respectively, the SCC found that the legislation not only failed minimal im-
pairment, but also the requirements of rational connection and
proportionality.'24 At a more qualitative level, the SCC's section 1 reasoning is
at times overtly normative and, to that degree, somewhat broad, even when
ostensibly connected to the idea of minimal impairment itself.12
From this perspective, an approach that emphasizes the desirability of giv-
ing the SCC flexibility to determine when and how much to engage in narrow
statement expost, as opposed to ex ante, will therefore also have clear advantages
when it comes to considerations of fit.
III. OBJECTIONS TO JUDICIAL DEFERENCE EXPOST
Two main objections may be raised to the idea of judicial deference, or narrow
statement, expost. One is that an approach of this kind on the part of the SCC
has the potential to undermine interpretive stability-or consistency-at a
lower court level, when the constitutional status of a legislative sequel is at is-
sue.'26 Another objection is that deference of this kind is contrary to the
independence of the judiciary, which is an unwritten constitutional princi-
ple. 27 However, while both point to valid concerns, neither provides a
persuasive basis for rejecting, at least out of hand, the desirability of new dia-
logue theory as a preferred account of the balance between the SCC and
Parliament or the legislature under the Charter.
124. Leon E. Trakman, William Cole-Hamilton & Sean Gatien, "R. v. Oakes 1986-1997: Back to
the Drawing Board" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83 at 145.
125. See e.g. M. v. H., supra note 116 at paras. 72-73.
126. Compare Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, "On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation" (1997) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359.
127. See e.g. Reference Re Remuneration ofJudges of Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; Luc B. Tremblay, "The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: the Limits of
Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures" (2005) 3 1 CON 617 at 634-38. Compare also
Roach, "Dialogic Review," supra note 2 at 51, 72, 96 (rejecting the idea of deference as part
of the metaphor of dialogue).
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When it comes to concerns about interpretive stability, it is important to
recognize that whatever approach the SCC adopts, some degree of interpretive
inconsistency is inevitable.128 It is predictable that lower courts will apply the
SCC jurisprudence in different ways and arrive at different outcomes. In the
case of legislative sequels, lower courts are also likely to apply a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality-which, in effect, mirrors the consequences of the
SCC applying ex post deference-in a way that creates little difference between
these and other cases.
Take the pattern exhibited in lower court decisions in the period between
the SCC's decision in Seaboyer and its subsequent decision in R. v. Darrach,'29
which considered whether Parliament's new rape-shield law violated the
Charter. In a number of cases during this period, the defendant wished to
present evidence that had not been addressed by the SCC in Seaboyer-
evidence of a complainant's prior, non-consensual sexual activity. In deter-
mining the admissibility of such evidence, especially prior to the SCC's
decision in R. v. Crosby,"3 ' the lower courts were guided by the SCC's inter-
pretation of the purpose of the rape-shield regime discussed in Seaboyer.
According to the Court, its obligation was to prevent juries from being distracted
by evidence that suggested that a complainant was either more likely to con-
sent to sexual intercourse, or less likely to be credible, by reason of her prior
sexual activity (the "twin myths")."' For the most part, the lower courts had
difficulty with this issue and were inconsistent in the approach they took in
this area.132
In cases more directly parallel to Seaboyer, where applying the legislative
sequel required consideration of whether the SCC was likely to defer to (and
128. For a definition of hard cases, see Ronald Dworkin, "Hard Cases" (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev.
1057.
129. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 [Darrachl.
130. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 912 at para. 17.
131. Seaboyer, supra note 70 at para. 41.
132. The Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia Courts of Appeal, for example, held that the
admissibility of such evidence was not limited by the relevant regime. See e.g. R. v. Harper
(1996), 149 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 295 (P.E.I.S.C., A.D.); ki v. O.B. (1995), 45 C.R. (4th) 68
(N.S.C.A). The British Columbia Supreme Court took the opposite view, holding that the
relevant provisions were equally applicable to both prior consensual and non-consensual
conduct in the case of a child complainant. See e.g. R. v. Vanderest (1994), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 5
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Moraes, [19981 B.C.J. No. 2871 (S.C.).
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uphold) such legislation, lower courts arguably adopted a more consistent ap-
proach. Unless asked to do so, they did not question the validity of the relevant
amended legislation, but instead applied a presumption in favour of validity. By
carefully considering the SCC's guidance in Seaboyer about the twin myths-to
which such legislation responded-the lower courts consistently identified
certain categories of cases (such as those involving children's evidence) where
the rape-shield regime was inapplicable.'33 They also managed, when applying
the Criminal Code,34 to balance the probative value versus the prejudice of
particular evidence in a fairly consistent way.13 If the SCC had better clarified
that it favoured a commitment to expost deference and narrow statement at the
first look stage (in Seaboyer), lower courts, would very likely have approached
these cases in an even more consistent way.
In the context of section 1 of the Charter, the SCC has made it clear that
there will often be a need to "nuance" the application of the Oakes test and give
what amounts to deference to the legislature in an attempt to balance compet-
ing Charter values ' Post 9/11, in the national security context in particular,
the SCC held that it is appropriate for courts to show heightened deference to
Parliament, and by extension the executive, in assessing whether a violation of
Charter rights can be justified. 37 Other courts, including the USSC and the
House of Lords, have endorsed similar principles of deference, or a similar
"margin of discretionary judgment," in the context of cases involving questions
of foreign affairs, immigration, and national security. 3 ' Therefore, it cannot be
133. See e.g. R. v. WS.C., 1994 CanLII 7592 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Harris (1997), 118 C.C.C. (3d)
498 (Ont. C.A.).
134. Supra note 115, s. 276, as am. by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), S.C.
1992, c. 38, s. 2.
135. See e.g. R. v. Majid (1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 263 (Sask. C.A.); R v. Ecker (1995), 96 C.C.C.
(3d) 161 (Sask. C.A.); and R. v. CE.N. (1998), 129 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (Alta. C.A.).
136. See Hiebert, Limiting Rights, supra note 79 at 61-71.
137. See e.g. Suresh v. Canada (Minister for Citizenship &Immigration), [20021 1 S.C.R. 3 at
paras. 30, 120 (noting the importance of deference to Parliament, and by extension the
Minister, in assessing the constitutionality of the deportation of non-citizens who are deemed
a threat to security).
138. In the United Kingdom, see A. and others v. Secretary of Statefor the Home Department,
[2005] 2 A.C. 68 at para. 29 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill (noting the importance of
deference to Parliament in assessing the compatibility of a system of control orders with
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights). In the United States, see e.g.
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that any form of deference by courts to legislative constitutional judgments is
antithetical to principles of judicial independence. The question must be one of
degree, rather than kind. As a matter of degree, narrow judicial restatement will
require deference of only a limited kind by Canadian courts.
Under this principle, in determining whether to defer to a reasonable legis-
lative sequel, Canadian courts will still be required to make a number of
important substantive findings. First, they must decide whether a legislative
sequel is reasonable in light of the basic constitutional commitment to freedom
and democracy in section 1 of the Charter. Second, they must determine
whether it is reasonable in light of their own prior judgments. In either in-
stance, rather than suspending its own judgment, the Court will be required to
make complex evaluative judgments about the nature of both prior judicial and
prior legislative reasoning.
On this point, the history of Darrach is instructive. In Seaboyer, (the
first look case) a majority held that the rape-shield regime in section 276 of
the Criminal Code imposed an unjustifiable limitation on an accused's rights
under sections 7 and 11 (d) of the Charter. One reason was that the scheme
was both unduly rigid and substantially overbroad in its approach, and failed
to exclude only irrelevant evidence (i.e., evidence going to the advancement
of the twin myths). Parliament responded in a way partially compliant with
this reasoning-i.e., it enacted a new regime that gave judges discretion to
admit evidence of the kind considered in Seaboyer: "relevant, specific in na-
ture, and [which has] significant probative value which is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the administration of justice."" 9
However, Parliament also sought to narrow the extent to which Seaboyer
would lead to the admission of such evidence (even if it was plausibly, but
minimally, relevant) by introducing additional requirements of specificity
and significance."'
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (noting the importance of deference to Congress in the
immigration context); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 229 (2008) (noting the importance of
deference to the political branches in assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on access
by suspected terrorists on access to habeas corpus procedures).
139. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), supra note 134. See discussion in
Darrach, supra note 129 at para. 17.
140. Ibid.
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In Darrach, the SCC upheld this new law by, in effect, engaging in a form
of narrow restatement. Rather than insisting on a broad reasoning of its prior
decision in Seaboyer, it emphasized two of its specific concerns in Seaboyer. First
was the way the legislative sequel addressed the blanket nature of the prohibition
and its pigeon-hole approach to relevance in the earlier, problematic provision.
Second was Darrach's decision to downplay Seaboyer's broader reasoning about
the irrelevance of particular legislative objectives (such as increasing the will-
ingness of complainants to report sexual assault) and the need to prioritize the
accused's right of full answer and defence by admitting all potentially relevant
and probative evidence that did not have the potential to cause substantial
prejudice."' Furthermore, the complainant's privacy played a different role in
the analyses; in Darrach, the Court held that excluding evidence of a complain-
ant's sexual history could legitimately be considered as furthering the "proper
administration of justice."" 2 In upholding the legislation as consistent with the
requirements of fundamental justice, Darrach also held that it was legitimate for
Parliament to "direct judges to the serious ramifications of the use of evidence
of prior sexual activity for all parties to these cases. '
Therefore, in Darrach, the Court engaged in its own independent, evalua-
tive judgment about the reasonableness of the legislatin. Before deciding to
uphold the sequel, it gave careful consideration to the degree to which Parlia-
ment had avoided an overly rigid, pigeon-hole approach to admissibility, and
also applied a balancing approach to determine the admissibility of evidence, as
endorsed by Seaboyer.1" The SCC specifically held that, by requiring evidence to
have significant probative value in order to be admissible, Parliament had not
raised the "threshold for admissibility to the point that it [was] unfair to the ac-
cused."' The Court also considered the reasonableness, in a more independent
sense, of Parliament seeking to exclude evidence of prior sexual history adduced
to support inferences other than those based on the twin myths."'
141. See e.g. R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at paras. 36, 53-55.
142. Darrach, supra note 129 at para. 41.
143. Ibid. at para. 40.
144. Ibid. at paras. 34, 36, 38.
145. Ibid. at para. 38.
146. Ibid. at para. 41.
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In fact, the main relevance of concerns about judicial independence in such
a case was at the level of perception, rather than reality. This also helps to ex-
plain why it was important, if one looks at Darrach from a broader perspective,
that there was an eight year delay between the hearing of the first and second
look cases. While ex post deference by the SCC in a case such as Darrach and
similar cases will not, according to my argument, involve any actual compro-
mise in judicial independence, there is always some danger that the public will
see them in this way-i.e., mistake a decision to engage in dialogue as simply a
decision to bow to political pressure. Where this occurs, there could be a cost to
the standing of the judiciary. One way for the SCC to avoid this is to try to en-
sure some delay in the hearing of sensitive second look cases." 7
Delay between the enactment of a legislative sequel and its consideration
by the Court increases both the actual and perceived insulation of the justices
from the particular political pressures leading to the sequel itself. It therefore
has an important capacity to reduce the risk that Canadians will mistake judi-
cial dialogue for capitulation. In some cases, delay will occur in the hearing of
second look cases without any deliberate action on the part of the SCC, but in
others it will require the Court to make strategic use of jurisdictional control
devices, such as the doctrines of mootness and ripeness." 8
Compared to a commitment to narrow restatement, use of such devices
will do less to distinguish judicial review in Canada from that in the United
States, where the USSC controls its docket with a view to some forms of consti-
tutional avoidance." 9 However, if one considers the timeframe of second look
cases, such as Eichman and Boerne, in which there was a one- and four-year de-
lay, respectively, between the relevant first and second look decisions of the
USSC, it still remains an important potential basis for distinguishing judicial
review in Canada from that in the United States."'0
147. Compare Casey, supra note 45 at 867 (noting the costs to public confidence in the USSC of
being perceived to "overrule under fire").
148. See e.g. Canadian (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626
at para. 50 [Liberty Net] (holding as moot a challenge to the Canadian Human Rights Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 13(1)[CHRA]). See further, infla notes 191-92.
149. See e.g. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (dismissing a
Constitutional challenge to the pledge of allegiance on the grounds of the petitioner's lack of
standing, given his status as a non-custodial parent).
150. See supra notes 32-38.
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IV. REVISITING THE RECORD OF DIALOGUE THUS FAR
One question which arises is how the record of dialogue to date should be as-
sessed under new dialogue theory. In current theories of dialogue, the test is
whether decisions which invalidate legislation are followed by a sequel. Dia-
logue does not depend on the nature of the response: whether the legislature
agrees or disagrees with the Court's interpretation of the Charter is irrelevant
because the focus is on the legislature's decision to respond. In new dialogue
theory, by contrast, successful dialogue requires both that: (i) the legislature'
modify a judicial decision in a manner that evidences some form of interpretive
disagreements, and (ii) that the SCC either uphold the legislative sequel-by ap-
plying an appropriate degree of expost deference under section 1, or avoid rapid
reconsideration of their validity. Despite these differences in approach, there is
a striking similarity between the findings of current dialogue theory and those
of new dialogue theory about the rate of dialogue under the Charter to date.
In Charter Dialogue, Hogg and Bushell suggest that dialogue has occurred
in approximately eighty per cent of cases involving a SCC or "significant" lower
court invalidating decision.151 After updating their study in 2007, in conjunc-
tion with Wade Wright, they again claimed that dialogue had occurred in
substantially more than half, or approximately sixty-one per cent of cases.
152
Skeptics of judicial review, by contrast, suggest that dialogue has occurred at a
much lower rate, and certainly at a rate of less than fifty per cent.153 Some de-
partmental scholars, who emphasize the importance of section 33 to Parliament
and the legislature's ability to contribute to the interpretation of the Charter,
argue that true dialogue-if there is such a thing-has occurred in as few as two
per cent (or one out of fifty-four cases).154 Others, who are willing to grant the
possibility of dialogue under section 1, suggest that dialogue has occurred at a
somewhat higher, but still troublingly low, rate of thirty per cent.155
151. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 2 at 96-98.
152. Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2 at 51-52.
153. See Christopher P. Manfredi &James Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg
and Bushell" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513 at 521 [Manfredi & Kelly, "Six Degrees"].
154. Ford, supra note 64. See Leeson, supra note 93 at 14.
155. See Manfredi & Kelly, "Six Degrees," supra note 153. Manfredi and Kelly identify the
percentage of cases in which Parliament or the legislature has enacted a sequel that evidences
some form of substantive interpretive disagreement (at 521). While this approach has
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New dialogue theory suggests that current dialogue scholars are largely
right-even if one puts aside Quebec's use of section 33 to re-enact French-
only signage laws in response to the SCC's decision in Ford-legislative sequels
have tended to enjoy an overwhelming degree of eitherformal or defacto success.
Of the twelve instances between 1982 and 2005 in which Parliament or a
legislature sought to narrow the SCC's interpretation of the Charter, four of
those instances of legislative dialogue met with a clear dialogic response on the
part of the SCC. One such instance, discussed above, was Darrach and the se-
quel to Seaboyer. The other three involved the Court's decisions in R. v.
Swain,156 R. v. Morales,157 and RJR-MacDonald. In all four of these instances, the
SCC used communicative and coercive remedies in the first look cases to
counter perceived legislative blockages. In second look cases, when shown to
have misjudged the degree of democratic support for a particular expansive read-
ing of Charter rights, the Court showed a willingness to engage in ex post
deference and narrow statement. The Court's approach to first and second look
cases is a model of new dialogue theory.
In Swain, the SCC implicitly rested its decision on the existence of blind spots
of accommodation in the provisions of the Criminal Code that provided for the
indefinite committal of persons acquitted of a crime on grounds of insanity.158
The Court held that such provisions burdened individuals' rights to bodily
freedom and security in a way that was much broader than necessary, particularly
given the unfettered power of the prosecution to put the question of insanity at
issue, but also because of potential alternative civil models for commitment.
Parliament responded by giving narrow effect to the Court's decision: it pre-
served the system of indefinite committal, but limited the right of the
prosecution to put forward the question of insanity, and introduced a separate
system for administrative committal for persons found unfit to stand trial or
advantages over that taken by Hogg and Bushell, it is problematic to the extent that it cannot
control for the percentage of cases in which legislative attempts at dialogue ought to have,
but did not, occur. Because of this, beyond ascertaining that some legislative attempts at
dialogue have in fact occurred, new dialogue theory focuses on the success rate of actual
(rather than hypothetically possible) dialogic legislative sequels.
156. (1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 [Swain].
157. [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 [Morales].
158. Swain, supra note 156.
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not guilty on grounds of mental illness."' 9 In a series of two subsequent cases,
Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)6 ' and Penetanguishene
Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (A.G.), 6' the SCC upheld this new legislation as
consistent with section 7 almost in its entirety. In doing so, it showed implicit def-
erence to Parliament's judgments as to the best way to combine the protection of
the accused with the protection of the community. It also downplayed Swain's
emphasis on the dangers of indefinite detention, in favour of a narrower focus on
the dangers of Parliament providing for indefinite detention without a treatment
component. This shift in focus in the judicial sequel can be seen as a form of ex
post narrow statement. 
162
In Morales, the SCC again identified the existence of a blind spot of ac-
commodation, holding that the denial of bail "in the public interest"
constituted a denial of the right to a fair trial provided by section 11 (e) of the
Charter, in part. because other, more specific, grounds for the denial of bail
made such a provision unnecessary.'63 Parliament responded in a way that
sought to give the decision narrow effect: it repealed the particular ground for
denying bail struck down in Morales, but simultaneously introduced a new, re-
lated ground for denying bail, based on the need "to maintain confidence in the
administration of justice.""' When this sequel came before the SCC in R. v.
Hall, 65 the SCC once again showed a willingness to defer to Parliament's at-
tempt to redefine the balance struck between competing rights, this time even
referring explicitly to the idea of dialogue. 66 In doing so, it also showed a clear
willingness to narrow its prior reasoning about the two exhaustive bases on
which Parliament could limit access to bail. The majority opinion recognized
159. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code, 1985], Part XX. 1; An Act to Amend
the Criminal Code (Mental Disorder), S.C. 1991, c. 43.
160. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 [Winko].
161. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498.
162. Winko, supra note 160 at paras. 92-93. In 2004, in R.v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, the
Court also retreated from this position slightly, by holding that the new scheme was
inconsistent with s. 7 as applied to persons permanently unfit and who do not pose a
significant threat to the safety of the public.
163. Morales, supra note 157 at 40-41.
164. Criminal Law Improvement Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 18, s. 59.
165. [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 [Hall].
166. Ibid. at para. 43.
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that it was open to Parliament to advance the administration of justice, not
only by preventing direct interferences with the trial process by an accused, but
also by ensuring that the presence of an accused in the community did not "call
into question the public's confidence in the administration of justice.'
'1 67
Likewise, in RJR-MacDonad, the SCC initially identified a blind spot of
accommodation in the Tobacco Products ControlAct, which prohibited tobacco-
advertising in Canadian media and required mandatory, unattributed package
warnings on tobacco products.168 Parliament responded by expressing disagree-
ment with the Court about the likely costs of giving greater accommodation to
interests of freedom of expression in this area.'69 In JTI-Macdonald, the SCC
deferred to this dialogic legislative sequel, this time on the stated basis that
changes since RJR-MacDonald in attitudes towards, and understandings of, the
harms caused by smoking justified the greater regulation imposed by the relevant
legislative sequel.' 71 In doing so, it engaged at a more implicit level in an expost
narrowing, or softening, of its prior reasoning about the distinct nature of
lifestyle advertising on the one hand, and brand and informational advertising
on the other. In JTI-Macdonald, the Court recognized both that "information
can be packaged in many ways," and that the "sophistication and subtlety of
tobacco advertising practices" meant that, at least in the case of young persons,
such advertising could be capable of increasing smoking.'
7
1
Consistent with the approach counselled by new dialogue theory, there was
some delay in each case between the hearing of the relevant first and second look
cases. In Swain and Seaboyer, a full eight years elapsed between the legislative se-
quel and the Court's decisions in Winko and Darrach. Similarly, there was a six
year delay between the sequel to Morales and the Court's decision in Hall.
167. Ibid. at paras. 40-41.
168. Supra note 71; Tobacco Products ControlAct, R.S.C. 1988, c. 20. The Court held that the
1988 Act unjustifiably infringed s. 2(c) of the Charter, considering that Parliament could
almost as effectively have achieved its objectives of protecting children while still allowing
informational and brand-preference advertising, and a government, rather than an
iinattributed, health-warning.
169. Tobacco Act, S.C. 1997, c. 13, s. 22 (allowing informational and brand advertising only in
"adult-only" places and in printed matter that had an 85 per cent or higher adult readership
and was delivered by direct mail).
170. Supra note 19.
171. Ibid. at para. 93.
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In other cases, the absence of any judicial sequel has meant that a number
of dialogic legislative sequels have enjoyed de facto effectiveness or success.
While the degree of legislative disagreement with the SCC has varied from one
case to another, seven SCC cases have, for example, arguably fallen into this
category of initiating a process of defacto dialogic success: namely, Committee
for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada,
172 R. v. Bain,'73 R. v. Daviault1 4
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (Attorney General),17 Corbiere v. Canada
172. [1991] 1 S.C.R 139 (holding that provisions of the Government Airport Concession Operations
Regulations, S.O.R./79-373, that prohibit advertising and solicitation in airports are an
unjustified limitation of s. 2(b) of the Charter, given both the degree of impairment of
political expression and the relative unimportance of the objective in general). The provincial
minister responded by promulgating S.O.R./95-228, which re-enacted the original ban, but
only with respect to commercial solicitation.
173. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 (holding that the provisions of s. 563(2) of the Criminal Code, 1970,
supra note 11 5-allowing the Crown to standby forty-eight potential jurors and to make
four peremptory challenges, while allowing the defence to make twelve peremptory
challenges-are an unjustified limitation of s. 11 (b) of the Charter, given the extent to which
the provisions at least appear to create an advantage for the prosecution, and, therefore,
unfairness). Parliamlent rcsponded by enacting An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (jury),
S.C. 1992, c. 41, s. 2, which repealed the provision for standby jurors, but simultaneously
increased the number of peremptory challenges available to the prosecution to equal those
that are available to the defence-that is, to twelve or twenty, according to the offence.
174. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (holding that the provisions of the Criminal Code, 1985, supra note 159,
that incorporate the common law rule that intoxication is not a defence to crimes of general
intent are not in accordance with the requirements of fundamental justice in s. 7 and are an
unjustified limitation of s. 11 (d) of the Charter. The Court allowed the possibility of a
defence of non-insane automatism, to be proven by the defence on a balance of
probabilities). Parliament responded by enacting An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Self-
Induced Intoxication), S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1, which made a defence of non-insane
automatism available (but only where intoxication is not self-induced or where the offence
does not involve an assault or a violation of physical integrity).
175. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (holding that the provision in s. 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act,
R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2-prohibiting the publication of "new poll" information within 3 days
of an election-is an unjustified limitation of s. 2(b) of the Charter, given the lack of narrow
tailoring or proportionality of such a prohibition). Parliament responded by enacting the
Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 326-28, which both complied with the SCC's
decision by restricting the prohibition on publication of polls to election day, but also
narrowed the effect of the SCC's emphasis on freedom of expression by requiring those who
publish earlier polls to provide details of their statistical methods on request or to publish a
disclaimer where such polls are not based on recognized statistical methods.
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(Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 76 R. v. Sharpe,177 and Figueroa v. Can-
ada (A.G.).'
78
In one additional case, a dialogic legislative sequel has also enjoyed defacto
success by reason of a SCC decision to delay consideration of a challenge. In R.
v. Zundel,179 the SCC held that a provision of the Criminal Code prohibiting
the willful publication of false news constituted an overbroad and unnecessary
limitation on freedom of expression, given the lack of any intent requirement
for such an offence and the availability of alternative criminal sanctions for the
willful incitement of racial hatred (upheld in R. v. Keegstra).'5 5 Parliament did
not re-legislate under the Criminal Code, but introduced a provision for the
award of civil penalties in relation to the transmission of hate messages (defined
176. [1999] 2 S.C.R 203 (holding that the provisions of s. 77(1) of the Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985,
c. 1-5-requiring that voters in band council elections must be "ordinarily resident" on the
reserve-are an unjustified limitation of s. 15(1) of the Charter, given that such a provision
does not minimally impair the equality rights of band members who are directly affected by
council decisions). The Minister responded by enacting new Indian Band Election
Regulations, C.R.C., c. 952, s. 3, S.O.R./2000-391, s. 2, which provided that persons could
continue to adopt a reserve as their place of ordinary residence, even in the event of a
"temporary" absence from that place.
177. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (holding that the importance of freedom of expression, combined with
the low risk of harm caused by the possession of certain explicit material, warrants reading in
exceptions to a Criminal Code prohibition against the possession of child pornography for
entirely self-created expression and private recordings of lawful sexual activity). Parliament
responded with Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Protection of Children and
Other Vulnerable Persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2004, which
would replace previous specific defences with a more general, yet also narrow, defence that
would be based on the fact that material does not pose "an undue risk of harm to persons
under the age of eighteen years."
178. [20031 1 S.C.R. 912 (holding that the provisions in ss. 24 and 18 of the Canada Elections
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 [Canada Elections Act]-requiring a political party to nominate
candidates in at least fifty electoral districts in order to obtain registered status-are an
unjustified limitation of s. 3, given more narrowly tailored means of achieving cost-savings in
public funding of elections, and doubts about the importance of this objective). Parliament
responded by enacting An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act,
S.C. 2004, c. 24, which allowed parties to field a single candidate, but simultaneously
increased the requirements of voter support and ongoing membership for the registration of
parties.
179. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
180. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
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so as not to require a showing of intent).' In doing so it engaged in dialogue
with the SCC about the proper balance between Charter commitments to free-
dom of expression on the one hand, and dignity and equality on the other. 112 In
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net,183 the SCC was
asked to consider the validity of this dialogic sequel, but declined to do so by fo-
cusing on the jurisdiction of the federal court to make certain orders under this
new remedial scheme. 8 ' The constitutional challenge was moot as a result.
In more than twenty years of litigation under the Charter, the SCC has ac-
tively refused to uphold a legislative sequel in its entirety in only one instance-in
Sauvd v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)(sub nom. Sauvi I).' 85 In Sauvd v. Canada
(Chief Electoral Officer)(sub nom. Sauvi ),186 the SCC struck down provisions of
the Canada Elections Act1 7 that disqualified prison inmates from voting in federal
elections as an unjustified limitation on the right to vote in section 3 of the Char-
ter. Parliament responded by introducing legislation that limited the
disqualification of prisoners to those who were serving a sentence of two years or
more, but in Sduvi II, the SCC again struck down the relevant limitation.'88
While the better view is probably that Sauv II was a failure of dialogue
on the part of the SCC, 189 it is also arguable that Sauv !l was exactly the kind
of case in which ex post deference was not required under new dialogue theoty:
namely, a case in which the relevant legislative response by Parliament was
not even arguably reasonable in light of the text of section 3 of the Charter and
section 1's commitment to a democratic society. While many constitutional
democracies have disenfranchised convicted offenders, it is difficult, at a princi-
pled level, to reconcile such practices with democratic commitments to equal
access to the franchise and treatment of the right to vote as a fundamental right.
181. See Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [19901 3 S.C.R. 892 .
182. See CHRA, supra note 148, ss. 13, 53, 54.
183. Liberty Net, supra note 148.
184. Ibid. at para. 50 (noting the mootness of the relevant Charter question).
185. [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Sauve I].
186. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 [Sauvil].
187. Supra note 178.
188. See An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1993, c. 19. s. 23(2).
189. Of course, the fact that four members of the SCC would have upheld the relevant sequel
under s. 1 points strongly in the other direction. See Christopher P. Manfredi, "The Day
Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauvi v. Canada" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105.
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From one view, legislatures in Canada have actually enjoyed a complete
success rate when passing reasonable legislative sequels in response to SCC deci-
sions, and, at the very least, have enjoyed a success rate of eleven out of twelve
(or twelve out of thirteen, if one includes the sequel to Ford-a rate of ninety-
two per cent). At a lower court level, dialogic legislative sequels have also enjoyed
a somewhat lower, but still high, rate of formal or defacto success.
Assessing the pattern of dialogue at this level will, of course, be more com-
plicated than at a SCC level. One reason is that any decision by a provincial
attorney general or the federal attorney to not appeal to the SCC may imply
that the legislative majority does not wholly disagree with a court's decision,
and, therefore, that the first stage of dialogue (namely a dialogic legislative
sequel) is less likely than at a SCC level. The second complicating factor is the
difficulty, from a practical perspective, of ensuring a non-biased sample of
lower court decisions. Thus, Hogg and Bushell were criticized in their initial
study for deciding to include "significant" provincial court judgments drawn
from Hogg's treatise, Constitutional Law of Canada,19 ° because such an ap-
proach could be under-inclusive and might reflect the ingoing assumptions or
biases of the authors. 1 The difficulty can be overcome by analyzing the more
than one thousand Charter cases reported in the Canadian Digest (prepared by
the Department of Justice), as those cases are selected by department officials
for their significance on a stand-alone basis, rather than for dialogic relevance.
An analysis of that data identifies forty-seven cases between 1982 and 2005 in
which provincial courts of appeal struck down statutory provisions, but the
matters never reached the SCC; seven of these met with a legislative response
that evidenced clear legislative disagreement.192
Among those seven instances of legislative dialogue, in three instances-
namely, R. v. Pugsley,193 R. v. Bryant, "' and Stoney Creek (City) v. Ad Vantage
190. (Toronto: Carswell, 2009).
191. See Manfredi & Kelly, "Six Degrees," supra note 153 at 516.
192. See Canadian Charter of Rights Decisions Digest, online:
<http:/lcanlii.org/en/calcharter digesttab-cas.html>.
193. (1982), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 141 (N.S.S.C., A.D.) [Pugsley]. (1982), 55 N.S.R. (2d) 163
(striking down provisions in the Criminal Code, 1970, supra note 115, that required that a
person arrested for murder show grounds that justified their release on bail).
194. (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 732 (striking down provisions in the Criminal Code, ibid., that
required an accused who was subject to an arrest warrant or an interim release order, and
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Signs Ltd.'9 -Canadian courts provided a dialogic response to sequels that nar-
rowed the effect of prior judicial rulings. In each of these cases, there was also
some willingness on the part of the courts to engage in a form of narrow state-
ment or deference expost.
In Pugsley, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that provisions of the
Criminal Code that required a person who had been arrested for murder to "show
cause" that justified his or her release on bail constituted an unjustified limitation
on the right to a fair trial.'96 Parliament sharply disagreed and re-enacted provi-
sions that provided for a presumption in favour of the ongoing detention of a
person charged with murder, unless an accused, after being given a reasonable
opportunity, could "show cause" that justified release.19 In response to this, other
provincial courts showed a willingness to give effect to this new regime, and the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld this sequel as consistent with the Charter by
explicitly narrowing the scope of its prior ruling in Pugsley.' 8
In Bryant, the Ontario Court of Appeal invalidated a provision requiring
an accused who failed to appear to be tried by judge alone, in the absence of a
legitimate excuse for not appearing.'99 Parliament disagreed and re-enacted the
provision in precisely the same terms; two years later the Court of Appeal up-
held this legislative sequel, finding that it was justified on the basis of the
emerging doctrine of waiver (which was not before the Court in Bryant)."'
In Stoney Creek, the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down, as an unjus-
tified restriction on freedom of expression, a municipal by-law that
prohibited the erection of signs in the municipality, except as authorized by
the council, or where erected by a service-station or builder. The municipal-
who failed to appear, to be tried by judge alone, unless he or she could establish to the
satisfaction of the judge a legitimate excuse for his or her failure to appear).
195. (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 65 (striking down a by-law that prohibited the erection of signs in the
municipality, except as authorized by the council or erected by a service-station or builder).
196. Criminal Code of Canada, 1970, supra note 115, s. 4 57(7)(2)(e).
197. Criminal Code, 1985, supra note 159, s. 522(2).
198. R. v. Bray (1983), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Sanchez, [1999] 176 N.S.R. (2d) 52
(C.A.) [Sanchez].
199. Criminal Code, 1970, supra note 115, s. 526.1 (as amended by Criminal Law Amendment Act
1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 65).
200. R. v. McNabb (1986), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 266 (B.C.C.A.). Note that leave to appeal from this
decision to the SCC was granted ([1987] 1 S.C.R. x), but the appeal was discontinued
([1987] 2 S.C.R. viii).
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ity's response narrowed the effect of the court's decision by restricting signs
to commercial property, limiting their dimensions (twenty square metres or
seven metres per face), and regulating their distance from the road.21 The
SCC subsequently upheld an almost identical by-law as (implicitly) a reason-
able legislative sequel.20 2
Consistent with the understanding of new dialogue theory, at least in the
cases of Pugsley and Stoney Creek, there was also a delay between the hearing of
the first and second look cases.20 Three additional instances of legislative dia-
logue, involving legislation enacted in response to the decisions of lower courts
in MacLean v. Nova Scotia (A. G.),2 4 R. v. Chief,05 and R. v. Music Explosion
Ltd. ,2" have also met with de facto dialogic success. In only two cases-those
involving the sequels to Minister of National Revenue v. Kruger Inc. 2 7 and Re-
form Party of Canada v. Canada (A.G./0 5 -have lower courts insisted on a
broad reading of their own prior rulings and struck down a legislative sequel
that was designed to narrow a court decision. Kruger also involved an area of
narrow disagreement between the court and the legislature about the need for
residual discretion on the part of courts to refuse a warrant.
Overall, from a quantitative point of view, there has been a dialogic success
rate at a lower court level of approximately seventy-five per cent.0 9 At a more
qualitative level, the record of dialogue to date in these cases also provides addi-
tional support for the position, under both new and current dialogue theory,
that section 33 remains relevant to dialogue in Canada, even when the override
is passive or dormant.
At the SCC level, all four instances in which the Court was actively willing to
engage in dialogue occurred in the context of provisions-such as sections 2(c), 7,
201. City of Stoney Creek, By-law 3042-89, Sign By-law, s. 5(g) (permitting a single billboard to
be erected on commercial property, with limited dimensions of 20 square metres or 7 metres
per face and with restrictions on the distance of the sign's location to the road).
202. Vann Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville (Town), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 158 [Vann Niagara].
203. See Sanchez, supra note 199 (17 year delay); Vann Niagara, ibid. (6 year delay).
204. (1987), 76 N.S.R. (2d) 296.
205. (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265.
206. (1990), 68 Man. R. (2d) 203.
207. [1984] 2 F.C. 535 [Kruger].
208. [1995] 4 W.W.R. 609.
209. That is, six out of eight instances.
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and 1 1-which are squarely within the purview of section 33.21" Likewise, at a
lower court level, there has also been a clear link between successful instances of
legislative dialogue and the availability of section 33. All three instances in which
the SCC or provincial courts have been actively willing to defer to legislative se-
quels to provincial court decisions have involved questions about the scope or
meaning of provisions such as the fair trial guarantee in section 1, or freedom of
expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.21'
By contrast, with only one exception, the instances in which the SCC or
the provincial courts have been unwilling to engage in dialogue-namely Sauvd
II and Reform Party of Canada-have occurred in the context of challenges un-
der section 3 of the Charter, and closely related freedom of expression
guarantees, where section 33 does not apply, either in whole or in part.
V. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE RECORD
THUS FAR
In confirming the existence of Charter dialogue in this way, new dialogue the-
ory does not suggest that the original proponents of dialogue in Canada got it
wholly right about the relationship between judicial review under the Charter
and concerns about democracy-or about the inevitable or stable nature of dia-
logue under the Charter.
In current dialogue theory, because the SCC handed down fifty-four dis-
tinct invalidating decisions between 1982 and 2005, by the end of that period
there had been fifty-four opportunities to test the presence of dialogue under
the Charter.212 According to the requirements of new dialogue theory, there
were, by contrast, only twenty-one instances in which Parliament or the legisla-
210. See supra notes 139-43, 156-71.
211. See supra notes 193-202.
212. This is based on Manfredi and Kelly's study of cases decided by the SCC between 1982 and
1995, a further study by Kelly between 1995 and 1997, and independent examination of
cases decided from 1998 through the end of 2004. See Manfredi & Kelly, "Six Degrees,"
supra note 153 at 526-27; James B. Kelly, "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 625. I note that one difference between my analysis and that of Manfredi and Kelly is
that I do.not treat R. v. Downey, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10, as an invalidating decision, and I treat
R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, as a second look case. The relevant number of cases
identified is also confirmed by Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2, at 55-59.
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ture sought actively to narrow the effect of Charter interpretation, and thus
where it was possible to consider the potential success of legislative dialogue.1 3
Even more important, less than half of those instances (i.e., ten or eleven cases)
required the SCC or a lower court to actively articulate its approach to dia-
logue: At the SCC level, there were only five cases that actively tested the
Court's commitment to new dialogue: namely, the four second look sequels to
Seaboyer, Swain, Morales, and RJR-MacDonald, plus Vann Niagara. In new dia-
logue theory, it is therefore premature to conclude, as current dialogue theory
does, that there is a well-established pattern of dialogue between the courts and
legislatures.
A second reason for doubting whether dialogue is in fact as stable as cur-
rent dialogue scholars suggest is that the SCC itself has not expressly endorsed
the requirements of (new) dialogue-i.e., the idea of ex post deference and nar-
row statement.214 On the contrary, even when referring to the idea of dialogue,
the SCC has tended to focus on the importance of legislative deference to the
SCC's own reasoning, not on the need for reciprocal deference by the Court
itself. Especially with respect to first look cases, the SCC has in fact appeared to
suggest that the possibility of parliamentary dialogue implies that it should
show less deference to legislative constitutional judgments, whether ex ante and
expost.
In Vriend v. Alberta," the Court considered whether the failure of Alberta's
human rights code to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination violated section 15(1) of the Charter. Justice lacobucci not only cited
the concept of dialogue to support the legitimacy of judicial review, 216 he also
suggested that the Court could protect gayand lesbian rights in the name of dia-
logue and regardless of the public's conception of equality.
217
213. Some of these instances involve delegated legislation, and are thus more marginal cases of
legislative dialogue. See supra notes 172, 195.
214. For the uneven treatment of dialogic ideas by the SCC, see e.g. Christopher P. Manfredi,
"The Life of a Metaphor: Dialogue in the Supreme Court, 1998-2003" (2004) 23 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 105; Richard Haigh & Michael Sobkin, "Does the Observer Have an Effect: An
Analysis of the Use of the Dialogue Metaphor in Canada's Courts" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 67.
215. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [Vriendl.
216. Ibid. at paras. 136-40.
217. Ibid
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Likewise in M v. H., when considering whether Ontario's Family Law
Act 1 infringed section 15(1) for failure to include same-sex couples in the sys-
tem of spousal support applicable to opposite-sex de facto couples, Justice
lacobucci suggested that while principles of dialogue favoured the Court
showing more deference to legislative policy judgments than others, they
favoured courts showing less deference to interpretive judgments, such as those
involving "[t]he simple or general claim that the infringement of a right is
justified under section 1."219
To some degree, new dialogue theory supports the approach taken by the
SCC in these cases because, when judicial review is understood against a
backdrop of commitments to ex post deference and narrow statement, courts
will have greater freedom than otherwise, ex ante, to use all available means in
order to counter perceived legislative inertia. There was also strong evidence,
circa 1998 to 1999, that legislative inertia of some kind existed in Canada with
respect to the recognition of gay and lesbian rights, even if the scope of such
inertia was uncertain.
220
New dialogue theory does not suggest, however, that popular
constitutional understandings will be irrelevant to the legitimacy of judicial
review in cases such as Egan v. Canada,221 Vriend, M. v. H, or Reference Re
Same-Sex Marriage,222 or that Canadian courts should feel free in such cases, in
the face of reasonable disagreement about the meaning of Charter rights, to
enforce their own preferred constitutional interpretation in preference to that of
a majority of Canadians, if such a majority position in fact exists.
On the contrary, it suggests that the democratic legitimacy of Charter
review will depend in large part on the willingness of Canadian courts to adopt
a more restrained approach than the USSC to assessing the constitutionality of
dialogic legislative sequels, such as those that very nearly arose in Alberta
following Vriend, and which did in fact occur in Ontario following M v. H,
218. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
219. Supra note 116 at paras. 78-79.
220. Environics Research Group, "Most Canadians Favour Gay Marriage - Approval of
Homosexuality Continues to Increase" (10 May 2001), online: Media Room
<http://erg.environics.net/media-room/default.asp?alD=432>.
221. [199512 S.C.R. 513.
222. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
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albeit at the purely symbolic level of the title given to the relevant legislative
sequel.223
The SCC, in various second look cases, has also shown a clear
ambivalence, or (at least) division, on the question of deference in second
look cases. Consider second look cases such as Hall or JTI-Macdonald. While
in Hall the Court engaged in a form of implicit expost narrow statement, its
reasoning emphasizes legislative deference to the Court, and not the idea of
reciprocal deference between the Court and Parliament. Even by referring to
the idea of dialogue itself, it suggested that the key to dialogue was deference
on the part of Parliament, noting:
Since the introduction of the Charter, courts have engaged in a constitutional dia-
logue with Parliament. This case is an excellent example of such dialogue. Parliament
enacted legislation ... [which the Court determined] was unconstitutional. ... After
considering this Court's reasons ... Parliament replaced the "public interest" ground
with new language.
224
In JTI-Macdonald, the Court also showed a willingness to narrow the scope
of its prior reasoning in RJR-MacDonald, but it rejected outright the idea that
the legislation represented some form of dialogue, or legislative sequel, which
should "militate for or against deference" by the Court.225 Rather, it emphasized
the degree to which Parliament, in enacting the second set of advertising restric-
tions, had itself shown deference to the "concerns expressed by the majority of
[the] Court in RJR-MacDonald.
' 2 6
In instances where the SCC has directly addressed the idea of ex post
deference, the justices have also tended to be sharply divided on the issue. In R.
v. Mill?27 and Darrach, for example, a majority of the SCC endorsed the idea of
223. This is why I do not classify M. v. H. as one of the thirteen core instances of dialogue.
Contrast Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2 at 9-10; Roach, "Canadian
Experience," supra note 2 at 537, n. 1. However, it should be noted that, to the extent that
the Ontario legislature's response was somewhat dialogic, the SCC helped ensure the success
of that sequel by avoiding a decision, on its merits, of an early challenge to that sequel under
the Charter. See Murphy, supra note 125.
224. Hall, supra note 165 at para. 43.
225. JTI-Macdonaa, supra note 19 at para. 11.
226. Ibid. at para. 7.
227. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 668.
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ex post deference,22 whereas in Sauv II, a differently constituted majority
expressly rejected the exact same principle, suggesting that:
The fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial rejection of
an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the Court should defer to
Parliament as part of a "dialogue." Parliament must ensure that whatever law it
passes, at whatever stage of the process, conforms to the Constitution. The healthy
and important promotion of a dialogue between the legislature and the courts should
not be debased to a rule of "if at first you don't succeed, try, try again."
229
From this perspective, it may be that it is not only the history of dialogue
in Canada which is more contingent than current dialogue scholars suggest. It
may also be that the future of dialogue depends increasingly not so much on
the embrace by the SCC of the current version of dialogue theory as a norma-
tive ideal, but rather on its rejection.
It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical, given the original concerns of dialogue
theorists, but it is also what all the "to-do" about metaphors and their meaning
is all about.23
228. Ibid. at para. 34.
229. Supra note 185 at para. 17.
230. Cf Hogg, Bushell Thornton & Wright, supra note 2.
